Libertarian Administrative Law by Sunstein, Cass Robert & Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian
Libertarian Administrative Law
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative
Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 39 (2015).
Published Version https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/
lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/82_1/14%20Sunstein
%20%26%20Vermeule_ART_Internet.pdf
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16152778
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
1 
Very preliminary draft 6/29/2014 
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 
Libertarian Administrative Law 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule** 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, several judges on the nation’s most important regulatory court -- 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit -- have given 
birth to libertarian administrative law, in the form of a series of judge-made doctrines 
that are designed to protect private ordering from national regulatory intrusion. These 
doctrines involve nondelegation principles, protection of commercial speech, procedures 
governing interpretive rules, arbitrariness review, standing, and reviewability. 
Libertarian administrative law can be seen as a second-best option for those who believe, 
as some of the relevant judges openly argue, that the New Deal and the modern 
regulatory state suffer from basic constitutional infirmities. Taken as a whole, libertarian 
administrative law parallels the kind of progressive administrative law that the same 
court created in the 1970s, and that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected in the 
Vermont Yankee case. It should meet a similar fate. Two cases to be decided next Term 
provide an opportunity for the Court to repudiate libertarian administrative law.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the years before Vermont Yankee1 was decided, the District of Columbia Circuit -- 
acting through a determined subset of its judges -- made a concerted effort to push administrative 
law in a direction that the Supreme Court was ultimately unwilling to go.2 These judges believed 
that administrative law should show special solicitude for environmental interests, consumer 
interests, and other interests that the judges thought to be under-represented in the political 
process, because the costs and dynamics of political organization yielded relatively greater 
authority to industry and producers. Perhaps influenced by prominent work in social science, 
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1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
2 A good discussion is Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee, the DC Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 345.  
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which seemed to support the claim of under-representation,3 the judges devised a distinctly 
progressive approach to administrative law, featuring, among other things, hybrid procedural 
requirements. These innovations required agencies to offer more procedures than the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandated,4 at least when special solicitude for 
environmental or other interests was necessary (in the judges’ view). 
 
To obtain a flavor of the period, consider these remarkable words: “Several recently 
enacted statutes attest to the commitment of the Government to control, at long last, the 
destructive engine of material ‘progress.’ But it remains to be seen whether the promise of this 
legislation will become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role.”5 The court affirmed that role in 
another case announcing that “[w]e stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long 
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts,”6 in which judges 
would be “increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches on fundamental 
personal interests in life, health, and liberty.”7 The court proclaimed that such “interests have 
always had a special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests at 
stake in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.”8  
 
It was not coincidental that such words appeared in an opinion vindicating the claims of a 
prominent environmental organization, which sought to ensure implementation of regulatory 
requirements.9 In a sense, the court’s approach could be seen as an effort to apply its own version 
of the famous footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case, suggesting that the judicial role should 
be heightened when politically vulnerable groups were at risk.10 The approach was a clear 
administrative law analogue to constitutional developments, associated above all with the 
Warren Court, that had an unmistakably progressive “tilt.” We might even see the court of 
appeals in the relevant period as a kind of junior-varsity Warren Court, enlisting principles of 
administrative law to protect preferred rights (“fundamental personal interests”) and to correct 
for democratic failures (“Therein lies the judicial role”). 
 
The implicit political science behind the court’s agenda, emphasizing the alleged 
organizational problems of dispersed interests, was not implausible, and it had some conceptual 
                                                
3 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); BURTON A. WEISBROD, JOEL F. 
HANDLER & NEIL K. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978). For 
related ideas on the constitutional side, see Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 713 (1985). 
4 For a catalogue, see Scalia, supra note 2, at 348-52.  
5  Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
6 Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
7 Id. at 598.  
8 Id. 
9 See Id. at 588. 
10 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). To be sure, the famous 
footnote referred to “discrete and insular minorities,” Id., rather than diffuse minorities, but the democracy-
reinforcing project is the same. See Ackerman, supra note 3. 
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and empirical foundations.11 But it was far from self-evidently correct,12 and even if correct, it 
did not obviously justify stringent judicial oversight.13 The more immediate problem with the 
lower court’s agenda, however, was that it was inconsistent with the governing law. 
“Fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty” may or may not deserve some kind 
of priority over “economic interests,” but it is a separate question whether judges may 
legitimately enforce any such priority. The APA did not permit judges to offer greater procedural 
protection to their preferred types of interests, barring a constitutional due process problem. The 
Supreme Court found it necessary to reassert control over administrative law, rebuking the lower 
court for its presumption -- most dramatically in Vermont Yankee itself, which held that hybrid 
procedural requirements were lawless impositions with no basis in the APA or other recognized 
legal sources.14 That holding was accompanied by a highly unusual passage, suggesting that the 
Court was aware that a more general principle was at stake: 
 
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it may not. But 
Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable 
review process in which courts are to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy 
questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject 
to re-examination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency 
action. Time may prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress 
or the States within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that 
judgment. In the meantime courts should perform their appointed function.15 
 
Since then, it has been observed that some lower-court doctrines have seemed to conflict 
with Vermont Yankee,  and perhaps with the more general principle as well, and scholars have 
periodically called for a “Vermont Yankee II,” or III or IV,16 to correct lower-court holdings that 
seem to defy the Court with respect to discrete issues of administrative law, above all by 
imposing procedural requirements that lack standard legal justifications.  
                                                
11 See OLSON, supra note 3; WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 3. 
12 See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1986) (suggesting concern about agency tendency toward overregulation and 
arguing that through OMB review, the President can implement “a broad view of the nation's economic 
interest”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2264 (2001).  
13 See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review? 101 YALE L.J. 
31 (1991). For a response, see Thomas Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After 
All? 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1997). 
14 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (the APA “established the maximum procedural requirements which 
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures. . . . 
[R]eviewing courts are generally not free to impose [additional procedural requirements].”); see also, e.g., 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (sternly warning against 
excessively stringent arbitrariness review in the same context, nuclear power regulation, at issue in 
Vermont Yankee). 
15 Id. at 557-58. 
16 See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. 
REV. 418 (1981); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 669 (2005); 
Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, (2007). 
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Yet the Court has not roused itself to police the D.C. Circuit in any systematic way, apart 
from ad hoc and relatively small-bore interventions, not generally involving large-scale 
administrative law doctrines.17 From the Court’s point of view, this is a plausible allocation of 
resources, corresponding to a similar lack of intervention during the pre-Vermont Yankee 
period18 (notwithstanding the DC Circuit’s frequently irreverent approach to the APA and the 
Supreme Court’s precedents). And for most of the post-Vermont Yankee period, there has been 
no systematic lack of fidelity by the D.C. Circuit that would warrant a rebuke.  
 
 In the past several years, however, administrative law has entered a world that is, in 
important respects, the mirror image of the world before Vermont Yankee. The prioritizing of 
“fundamental personal interests” over “economic interests,” at least as the court understood those 
terms in the 1960s and 1970s, has been turned upside down, and in part by an identifiable 
understanding of the dynamics of the political process. Today, a determined subset of judges on 
the D.C. Circuit explicitly hold a distinctive view -- articulated both in extrajudicial writings and 
in judicial opinions -- that has found its way into administrative law decisions, sometimes with 
questionable support in the existing legal materials and sometimes with no support whatsoever. 
According to that view, political distortions yield policies that depart unjustifiably, and 
harmfully, from the baselines set by market ordering. These policies violate liberty, properly 
understood, and also threaten to reduce social welfare. As a corrective, the judges have 
articulated an approach that we call libertarian administrative law. This approach seeks to use 
administrative law to push and sometimes shove policy in libertarian19 directions, above all 
through judge-made doctrines that lack solid support in the standard legal sources.  
 
In light of the writings of some of the relevant judges, libertarian administrative law may 
be understood as a second-best enterprise -- an attempt to compensate for perceived departures, 
during the New Deal, from the baseline of the original constitutional order. We can understand 
libertarian administrative law to be inspired by a particular, highly controversial account of the 
Constitution – one that does not fit well with the Supreme Court’s current understanding of the 
founding document. A central assumption in the argument is that the original constitutional 
order, as these judges envision it, was far more protective of liberty and of market baselines, and 
thus less hospitable to politically-distorted governmental decisionmaking, than is the current 
state of constitutional law. Libertarian administrative law, then, emerges from a long-term 
                                                
17 In some of the relevant cases, however, the stakes have been high. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
18 See Scalia, supra note 2. 
19 On some views, the more accurate term is “classical liberal.” See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE 
CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014). There is a 
continuum of views among the theorists and judges we will mention; we use “libertarian” for simplicity and 
to capture the common denominators among these views. 
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programme to restore the “Lost Constitution”20 -- or at least to approximate that goal as closely 
as possible. 
 
 Our principal aims here are descriptive and doctrinal. We seek first to establish the 
existence of this libertarian administrative law, to sketch its contours, and to elicit the 
justifications that its proponents offer. This descriptive enterprise, we hope, will be valuable 
without regard to normative controversies. Those who are inclined to favor libertarian 
administrative law, and to hope that it will flourish, will doubtless approve of some, many, or all 
of the doctrinal developments that we catalogue.  
 
Our evaluative comments are offered not from the external standpoint of (say) 
economics, political science, philosophy, or public choice theory, but from the internal 
standpoint of administrative law itself. The main problem with libertarian administrative law is 
that it lacks sufficient respect for the legal sources, emphatically including controlling precedents 
of the Supreme Court -- in some cases quite recent, clear, and bipartisan precedents. Across a 
number of doctrinal contexts, panels of the D.C. Circuit have acted aggressively to reshape 
administrative law in ways that are not easy to square with the APA and governing precedents of 
the Supreme Court. In some cases, the D.C. Circuit can claim some (but not strong) support in 
those precedents; in other cases, it is operating very much on its own. At the same time, many of 
the resulting rulings are difficult for the Court to police -- as was progressive administrative law 
in the years before Vermont Yankee. In its ambitious forms, libertarian administrative law, like 
its progressive doppelganger, is best seen as a proposal for large-scale legal change, rather than a 
valid interpretation of current legal sources.  
 
For reasons that we will elaborate, we believe that any significant movement in either 
progressive or libertarian directions would be in grave tension with the foundations of the APA 
and of administrative law, properly understood -- and hence that the Supreme Court would be 
properly criticized if it were to embrace any such movement. American administrative law is 
organized not by any kind of politicized master principle, but by commitments to fidelity to 
statute, to procedural regularity, and to nonarbitrary decisionmaking. These commitments will 
sometimes result in rulings that libertarians will approve, and sometimes in rulings that 
libertarians will deplore. Any sustained effort to engraft libertarian thinking, or some kind of 
progressive alternative, onto the legal materials will be unfaithful to those materials. 
 
But our principal goal here is narrower. While we will elaborate and defend a general 
claim about political ideology and administrative law, our major aim is to demonstrate that in 
some important rulings, the D.C. Circuit has been moving in libertarian directions without 
sufficient warrant in existing sources of law, including the decisions of the Supreme Court itself. 
While most of the decisions that we discuss cannot quite be described as lawless, some can, and 
                                                
20See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
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as a whole they go beyond the boundaries of appropriate interpretation of the law as it now 
stands. They do so with an identifiable ideological valence. 
 
 Part I provides a brief discussion of the context, with reference to the separate opinions of 
the relevant D.C. Circuit judges and their extrajudicial writings on constitutional questions. Part 
II, the heart of the paper, describes and illustrates libertarian administrative law in six doctrinal 
contexts: nondelegation, commercial speech, rulemaking procedure, arbitrariness review, 
standing, and reviewability. Part III offers a more general evaluation of the programme of 
libertarian administrative law and, above all, its fit with the existing structure of American 
administrative law. The fit, we argue, is not good, no matter how charitably we treat the 
decisions. Overall, and in its ambitious forms, libertarian administrative law is best understood as 
part of a movement -- the “Constitution in Exile” or “Lost Constitution” movement21 -- aimed at 
changing the framework of American public law more broadly. We suggest that on a suitable 
occasion, the Court should excise libertarian administrative law root and branch, by issuing a 
modern version of Vermont Yankee, requiring the D.C. Circuit to hew more closely to the APA 
and its own precedents, and also reminding lower courts that administrative law lacks any kind 
of ideological valence. As we will see, the Court has recently granted certiorari in two cases – 
one involving the so-called “nondelegation doctrine,”22 and one involving interpretive rules23 – 
that jointly or severally provide a suitable occasion for repudiating libertarian administrative law. 
 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Libertarian Constitutional Law 
 
Some constitutional observers believe that the American Constitution is, or should be 
interpreted to be, libertarian in character, in the sense of protecting a specific set of rights -- 
especially property rights and economic rights -- from government intrusion.24 On this view, 
libertarianism, of a certain kind, plays a central role in the constitutional settlement. The position 
is sometimes taken to impose sharp limits on national power, and to recognize unenumerated 
rights of liberty, property, and contract that go beyond existing judicial understandings.25  
 
                                                
21 See id.; Douglas Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REGULATION 83, 84 (1995).  
22 Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3533 (U.S. June 23, 2014) (No. 13-1080). 
23 Mortgage Bankers Ass’n  v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Perez v. 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 82 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-1041), and Nickols v. Mortgage 
Bankers Ass’n, 82 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-1052). 
24 See BARNETT, supra note 20, at 32-52; EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 4. 
25 See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 303-382 for an especially detailed account. 
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This position has been understood to suggest that the Constitution is in some sense “lost” 
or “in exile.”26 In academic circles, there has been a vigorous (and continuing) effort to support 
this suggestion, sometimes marching under the banner of “originalism,”27 and sometimes 
invoking instead arguments from social science, moral philosophy, and political theory.28 A 
central goal is to protect liberty and property, rightly understood, by diminishing the authority of 
powerful private groups, or “factions,” which, on this view, help to account for the growing, and 
liberty-invading, power of government. Whatever its merits as a matter of principle, no one 
doubts that this position would have dramatic implications, throwing much of the modern 
administrative state into the dustbin.29  
 
Libertarian constitutional law has many academic defenders, even though it has not 
enjoyed much success on the Supreme Court. For our purposes, what is noteworthy is that 
several of the most prominent judges on the D.C. Circuit have explicitly endorsed 
understandings of this kind. We are keenly aware that extrajudicial writing by federal judges 
may not reflect their views about appropriate decisionmaking by courts as a whole. We shall turn 
shortly to the links between judicial behavior and the views we describe here. 
 
B. “The Wheels Began to Come Off” 
 
In a speech delivered in several places and ultimately published in the Cato Supreme 
Court Review, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg – one of the architects of some principles of 
libertarian administrative law, as we will see -- wrote that if judges are to be faithful to the 
written Constitution, they must try “to illuminate the meaning of the text as the Framers 
understood it.”30 In his account, judges did exactly that from the founding until the first third of 
the twentieth century. In the 1930s, however, “the wheels began to come off.”31 With the Great 
Depression and the actions of the Roosevelt Administration, the Court refused to remain faithful 
to the founding document.32 Judge Ginsburg contended that the infidelity occurred in three 
different ways, each of them relevant to our topic here.  
 
The first involved the reach of the national government. In Judge Ginsburg’s view, the 
Court employed “loose reasoning” and indulged in “a stark break from precedent” in upholding 
the National Labor Relations Act.33 In his view, the Court thereby expanded congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause in a way that fit awkwardly, and perhaps not at all, with the 
                                                
26 See BARNETT, supra note 20 (on “lost”); Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 84 (on “in exile”). EPSTEIN, supra 
note 19, is in the same vein. 
27 See BARNETT, supra note 20, at 91-119. 
28 See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 17-33. 
29 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 19. 
30 Douglas Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 14 (2003). 
31 Id. at 15. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 16. 
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Constitution as written. Second, the Court allowed administrative agencies to wield broad 
discretionary power, thus violating the nondelegation doctrine as embodied in Article 1, section 
1.34 Citing the Court’s validation of a provision of the Clean Air Act that appears to grant broad 
discretion to the Environmental Protection Agency, Judge Ginsburg urged that the “structural 
constraints in the written Constitution have been disregarded.”35  Third, he contended that the 
Court has “blinked away” central provisions of the Bill of Rights.36 As a particular example, he 
referred to the Takings Clause, which, he lamented, has been read to provide “no protection 
against a regulation that deprives people of most of the economic value of their property.”37 It 
seems clear that Judge Ginsburg believes that properly interpreted, the Takings Clause would 
provide much stronger protection of property rights than it now does.  
 
Three cornerstones of libertarian constitutional law involve certain conceptions of 
federalism, delegation, and individual rights. As early as 2003, Judge Ginsburg endorsed a 
version of all of them. But he is not the only judge on the Circuit to hold such views. 
 
C. “Underground Collectivist Mentality” 
 
Judge Janice Rogers Brown has spoken in even stronger terms, seeing the New Deal, and 
the rise of modern administrative agencies, as a clear betrayal of the original constitutional 
settlement. In a speech in 2000,38 for example, she contended that the New Deal “inoculated [sic] 
the federal Constitution with a kind of underground collectivist mentality,” which  transformed 
the Constitution “into a significantly different document.”39 She objected to Justice Holmes’ 
celebrated dissenting opinion in Lochner as “all too famous”  and lamented that in the 1930s, the 
“climate of opinion favoring collectivist social and political solutions had a worldwide 
dimension.”40 In these ways, she suggested that the New Deal was essentially unconstitutional 
and that Holmes’ deferential approach was unjustified.  
 
But she also offered a more specific critique of the New Deal period. In her view, the 
collectivist (communist?) creed “that differences between the few and the many can, over time, 
be erased,” should be seen as “a critical philosophical proposition underlying the New Deal.”41 
That creed was fatally inconsistent with the founding document. Indeed, it worked “not simply to 
                                                
34 Id. at 16-17. 
35 Id. at 17. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Janice Rogers Brown, Associate Justice, Cal. Sup. Ct., Address to the Federalist Society at the 
University of Chicago Law School, "A Whiter Shade of Pale": Sense and Nonsense —The Pursuit of 
Perfection in Law and Politics (Apr. 20, 2000), available at http://perma.cc/T2VS-4J7F.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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repudiate, both philosophically and in legal doctrine, the framers' conception of humanity, but to 
cut away the very ground on which the Constitution rests.” 42 
 
For Judge Brown, the upshot is that “the economic convulsions of the late 1920's and 
early 1930's . . . . consumed much of the classical conception of the Constitution.”43 Notably, and 
with a judgment that overlaps with that of Judge Ginsburg, she contends that “[p]rotection of 
property was a major casualty of the Revolution of 1937.”44 As a result, it “became government's 
job not to protect property but, rather, to regulate and redistribute it.”45 In the current era, 
moreover, “there are even deeper movements afoot. Tectonic plates are shifting and the resulting 
cataclysm may make 1937 look tame.”46 Needless to say, this statement was meant as a warning.  
 
Judge Brown went further still. Speaking of government authority, she said, "[W]e no 
longer find slavery abhorrent. We embrace it."47 She also cautioned, "If we can invoke no 
ultimate limits on the power of government, a democracy is inevitably transformed into a 
kleptocracy - a license to steal, a warrant for oppression."48 
 
D. Off the Bench, On the Bench: “[P]roperty is At the Mercy of the Pillagers” 
 
There is a gulf between extrajudicial statements by federal judges and actual behavior on 
the bench. It would be wrong and unfair to think that any extrajudicial statement is necessarily a 
helpful guide to judicial behavior, because role greatly matters, and because the judicial role 
imposes constraints that judges do not face when they are giving speeches. A judge might firmly 
believe that the New Deal, the Great Society, and the Affordable Care Act were serious mistakes, 
while also believing, quite firmly, that those personal beliefs play no legitimate role in legal 
interpretation. A judge might even believe that the Supreme Court has taken some gravely wrong 
turns, or even gone off the rails, while also following the very decisions that she abhors. But 
speeches of this kind, demonstrating a shared antipathy to the New Deal and its constitutional 
legitimation, are at least relevant data points.  
 
In any event, the judges at the core of the libertarian movement in administrative law 
have not declined to enlist their beliefs while on the bench as well. In both majority opinions and 
separate opinions, the relevant judges have explained their constitutional project, its limits under 
the current New Deal constitutional order, and the second-best administrative-law project that 
flows from these. We will discuss majority opinions shortly. For now, we will focus on the 
                                                
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Janice Rogers Brown, Speech to the Institute for Justice, Fifty Ways to Lose Your Freedom (Aug. 12, 
2000), available at http://communityrights.org/PDFs/8-12-00IFJ.pdf. 
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startling concurrence filed by Judges Brown and David Sentelle in a case called Hettinga v. 
United States49 from 2012. The Hettinga concurrence is best understood as a kind of manifesto of 
libertarian administrative law. 
 
Hettinga involved a statute, the Milk Regulatory Equity Act of 2005, that “subjected 
certain large producer-handlers of milk to contribution requirements applicable to all milk 
handlers.”50 Under the complex and highly reticulated federal regulatory scheme that governs the 
production and sale of milk, the Hettinga family operated two enormous industrial dairy farms 
that enjoyed a special regulatory exemption from federal milk-marketing orders.51 In 2005, 
however, a new statute extended the regulatory scheme to cover the Hettingas’ operations, 
although it left in place the exemptions for other large firms in other areas.52 Indeed, the 
Hettingas claimed that their operations were in practice the only ones currently covered by the 
statutory extension, although the terms of the statute did not mention them by name and used 
facially neutral criteria tied to the size and location of firms.53 The Hettingas attacked the statute 
on constitutional grounds, claiming that it amounted, in effect, to a forbidden Bill of Attainder, 
and that it violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.54 
 
In a per curiam opinion, the panel unanimously disposed of the Hettingas’ claims under 
settled constitutional law.55 Even if the statute currently covered only the Hettingas, it was in 
principle facially neutral and open-ended, and would cover any firm that in the future met the 
statutory criteria; for that reason, it lacked the targeting and closure necessary to constitute a bill 
of attainder.56 As for the equal protection argument, the statute did not impinge on any 
fundamental right or deploy any suspect classification, and thus needed only to survive rational-
basis review.57 And there was easily a rational basis: the statute in effect closed loopholes in the 
scheme of dairy regulation by removing a regulatory exemption that the Hettingas’ massive 
operations had previously enjoyed.58 
 
Under current law, the case was easy, and might have been disposed of summarily. Judge 
Brown, however, offered a separate opinion -- joined by Judge Sentelle, and thus signed by a 
majority of the panel -- that heatedly criticized the fundamental premises underpinning the whole 
New Deal constitutional order.59 For Brown, the case revealed “an ugly truth: America's cowboy 
                                                
49 677 F.3d 471, 480-83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring). 
50 Id. at 474 (per curiam). 
51 Id. at 475. 
52 See Id. at 476.  
53 See Id.  
54 Id. The Hettingas also advanced a due process claim, Id. at 479-80, but this is not relevant for our 
purposes. 
55 See Id. at 474. 
56 Id. at 477-78. 
57 Id. at 478. 
58 Id. at 479. 
59 Id. at 480-83 (Brown, J., concurring). 
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capitalism was long ago disarmed by a democratic process increasingly dominated by powerful 
groups with economic interests antithetical to competitors and consumers. And the courts, from 
which the victims of burdensome regulation sought protection, have been negotiating the terms 
of surrender since the 1930s.”60 On this view, “the judiciary's refusal to consider the wisdom of 
legislative acts—at least to inquire whether its purpose and the means proposed are ‘within 
legislative power’” -- have lead inevitably to the Court “abdicat[ing] its constitutional duty.”61 
Most remarkably of all, and consistent with her speeches, Brown attempted to connect her 
economic libertarianism with a version of the original understanding: 
 
This standard [rational-basis review of economic regulation] is particularly troubling in 
light of the pessimistic view of human nature that animated the Framing of the 
Constitution—a worldview that the American polity and its political handmaidens [sic] 
have, unfortunately, shown to be largely justified. See James Madison, Notes of Debates 
in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 39, 42 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987). Moreover, what 
the Framers theorized about the destructive potential of factions (now known as special 
or group interests), experience has also shown to be true. The Federalist No. 10, at 78, 81 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The judiciary has worried incessantly 
about the "countermajoritarian difficulty" when interpreting the Constitution. But the 
better view may be that the Constitution created the countermajoritarian difficulty in 
order to thwart more potent threats to the Republic: the political temptation to exploit the 
public appetite for other people's money—either by buying consent with broad-based 
entitlements or selling subsidies, licensing restrictions, tariffs, or price fixing regimes to 
benefit narrow special interests.62 
 
In this vision, the “countermajoritarian Constitution” enforced by searching judicial review 
protects the public interest from both broad-based entitlements that corrupt the citizenry, and also 
from exploitation by narrow special interests, whereas “[r]ational basis review means property is 
at the mercy of the pillagers.”63  
 
It is not obvious who the “pillagers” are supposed to be, or exactly what goods Brown 
thinks a countermajoritarian judiciary, protecting economic liberty, is supposed to produce. 
Mightn’t the “narrow special interests” themselves use the judiciary to protect their privileged 
position?64 If the problem is with human nature, aren’t judges human too, and thus by hypothesis 
prone to abuse the expanded power that Brown would give them?65 Perhaps there are plausible 
                                                
60 Id. at 480. 
61 Id. at 481. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 483.  
64 See Elhauge, supra note 13, at 67 (“the litigation process cannot be treated as exogenous to interest 
group theory: it too is susceptible to interest group influences”). 
65 See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System? 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1750-54 
(2013). 
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answers to such questions, and to her credit, Judge Brown is candid in acknowledging that 
binding constitutional precedent was inconsistent with her vision of the constitutional order.66  
 
Our thesis, however, is that on important occasions, Judge Brown and a critical mass of 
her colleagues on the D.C. Circuit -- especially including Judges Ginsburg and Sentelle, joined 
on occasion by Judges Henderson, Randolph, Silberman, and Williams -- have turned their 
efforts elsewhere. Unable to make significant progress on the constitutional margin (except 
insofar as constitutional doctrines and administrative law doctrines plainly overlap), they are 
engaged in an effort to protect the market from its would-be “pillagers” by means of 
administrative law. In several cases, they have been willing to criticize the Supreme Court itself. 
Consider, for example, Judge Brown’s remarkable attack on Massachusetts v. EPA in the context 
of a plea for Supreme Court reconsideration: “I do not choose to go quietly [and I engage] 
Massachusetts’s interpretive shortcomings in the hope that either Court or Congress will restore 
order to the CAA.”67   
 
In short, Judge Brown and some of her colleagues, generally stymied on the 
constitutional front, have pursued a second-best project, one that attempts to move the apparently 
nonideological and recalcitrant materials of administrative law in libertarian directions. We will 
also see that they have attempted to fold disfavored modes of constitutional libertarianism, such 
as substantive due process protection of property and economic liberty, into constitutional law 
itself, especially with nondelegation and commercial speech law; that too is a kind of substitute 
for the ideal. We now turn to documenting their second-best project and its problems. 
 
II. Libertarian Administrative Law 
 
 To establish the existence of libertarian administrative law, we could imagine a range of 
strategies. Perhaps the most obvious would be quantitative. We might compile a large data set 
and investigate voting behavior. Suppose, for example, that certain judges rarely, or never, vote 
in favor of environmental groups or labor organizations when they argue for more aggressive 
regulation. Suppose that the same judges vote almost always, or always, for companies when 
they attempt to invalidate regulation. If so, we might have a strong hint that those judges would 
be practicing at least some form of libertarian administrative law. Indeed, it might be thought 
that we have a kind of “smoking gun.”  
 
In fact, quantitative studies of this general kind do exist.68 They tend to show a significant 
asymmetry between the voting behavior of Republican appointees and that of Democratic 
                                                
66 See 677 F.3d at 480 (Brown, J., concurring). 
67 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 
No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *3 (Dec. 20, 2012) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
68 See Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 
(1993); Emerson Tiller & Frank Cross, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 YALE 
L.J. 2155 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R,. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
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appointees, with the former showing a distinctive tendency in what is, broadly speaking, the 
libertarian direction, and the latter showing a distinctive tendency in what is, broadly speaking, 
the progressive direction.69 Thus, for example, Republican appointees are more likely to vote to 
uphold agency decisions under a Republican president, when agency decisions are more likely to 
be deregulatory; Democratic appointees show the opposite pattern. If we code decisions by 
asking whether a regulated entity is seeking to fend off regulation, or whether some kind of 
public interest group is seeking to impose heightened regulatory requirements, we will see an 
unmistakable “skew” on both sides. Within the D.C. Circuit, the same patterns have been found 
in the past, though we lack recent data.70 On the basis of these findings, we might reasonably 
speculate that the Democratic appointees are drawn to some form of progressive administrative 
law, whereas Republican appointees vote in more libertarian directions. 
 
But it is important to be careful with such findings. By themselves, they might turn out to 
be too coarse-grained to demonstrate any kind of progressive or libertarian administrative law. 
Perhaps one or another side is simply right, on the basis of the existing legal materials, and 
ideological predispositions are unimportant or less important. Perhaps some kind of tendency, 
measured by votes, tells us nothing about progressive or libertarian inclinations, at least if it is 
unaccompanied by an analysis of the legal foundations for those votes. To date, moreover, we do 
not have more specific evidence, showing differences across individual judges. (Nor do we have 
contrary evidence; the relevant questions have not been investigated in sufficient detail.) Any 
such evidence would be helpful, assuming that statistical power could be achieved; if some 
judges almost always vote in favor of challenges by regulated entities, some kind of libertarian 
inclination might plausibly be inferred. But even large data sets, tabulating mere votes, would 
also raise questions about appropriate generalizations across what would inevitably be a 
heterogeneous range of disputes. Votes alone may be uninformative unless they have some 
tension with the governing legal materials (such as the APA or decisions of the Supreme Court), 
which a tabulation as such cannot demonstrate. 
 
Furthermore, however convincing such findings would be as social science, they would 
necessarily provide only an external perspective. Our method here is internal and doctrinal rather 
than quantitative. If it were possible to show that certain judges embraced distinctively 
libertarian doctrinal principles, we would be able to establish the existence of libertarian 
administrative law, and the demonstration would be more powerful still if current legal materials, 
from authoritative statutes and the Supreme Court, did not support those doctrinal principles. To 
a significant extent, we hope to establish exactly that. At the same time, some doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                                       
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008).  
69 Id.  
70 See Revesz, supra note 68, at 1719; Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 YALE L.J..2155 (1998). 
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categories cannot be self-evidently categorized along a libertarian-nonlibertarian continuum. 
Nonetheless, we hope to show that the linkage is sufficiently clear. 
 
Three qualifications must be offered at the outset, lest we take on a greater burden of 
proof than we should have to carry. First, we do not claim that the D.C. Circuit, or some subset 
of its judges, have invariably ruled in libertarian directions, in blatant defiance of the APA and 
the Supreme Court. We could devise a imaginary court that would do so – with, for example, 
new principles that always denied standing to those seeking more aggressive regulation, or 
arbitrariness review that proved to be a systematic barrier to regulatory intervention, or changes 
in existing doctrines that denied agencies any kind of deference whenever they interpreted 
statutes in such a way as to increase their regulatory authority. The D.C. Circuit is not that 
imaginary court, and no subset of its members can be counted as such. It would be easy to find a 
set of D.C. rulings, joined by all of its members, that uphold agency decisions that libertarians 
abhor, or that invalidate agency decisions that libertarians approve. Because of their distinctive 
role, judges care about the law, and they cannot and do not act in a single-minded way. 
Nonetheless, we do hope to show an unmistakably libertarian pattern, paralleling the progressive 
patterns of several decades ago.  
 
Second, the nature of legal doctrine is such that most rules rest on multiple rationales; 
they are overdetermined by arguments. Given that fact, it will rarely be possible to demonstrate 
that any particular doctrine is dictated, necessarily and exclusively, by the project of libertarian 
administrative law. In the aggregate, however, over a set or series of doctrinal questions, a 
convincing pattern may emerge. Schematically, suppose there are three independent doctrinal 
questions: 1, 2, and 3. On question 1, the panel adopts a position whose possible rationales are L 
(the libertarian rationale) or O¹ (some other rationale). On question 2, the panel adopts a position 
whose possible rationales are L or O² (different from O¹). On question 3, the panel adopts a 
position whose possible rationales are L or O³ (different from both O¹ and O²). As to any 
particular one of these doctrinal questions, libertarianism is not the only possible reading of the 
panel’s position. Over all of them, however, because the alternative rationales are different in 
each case, the libertarian reading becomes more convincing. It is no valid objection to our 
account, therefore, to show that the libertarian programme is not the sole plausible explanation 
for any given doctrine. The evidence must be viewed in the aggregate. 
 
Third, the nature of judicial decisionmaking in Article III courts is such that the doctrinal 
questions fairly presented by the cases are rarely perfectly tailored to advance an ideological 
agenda. Judges have to resolve questions presented by parties, in messy factual and legal 
contexts, and have to implement their large-scale understandings of administrative and 
constitutional law through doctrinal devices -- rules, presumptions, qualified standards, and so 
forth -- that are not perfectly calculated to capture all and only the outcomes that a libertarian 
judge will want to capture. It suffices if the holding, and an associated doctrine, are better 
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calculated to capture libertarian outcomes, on average and in the long run, than are the feasible 
alternative holdings available to the judge in the case.  
 
It is not a sufficient objection to our account, therefore, to point out that we do not 
discuss doctrines and holdings that cannot be characterized as libertarian, or that the doctrines 
and holdings that we discuss do not capture certain outcomes libertarians would like, or sweep in 
certain outcomes libertarians do not like. Real doctrines will rarely if ever be perfectly tailored to 
capture libertarian (or progressive) outcomes, or to promote libertarian (or progressive) aims. 
Instead our proper burden is to show that the relevant doctrines and holdings are plausibly 
calculated to capture libertarian outcomes and promote such aims in a rough, aggregate, long-run 
way, relative to the available alternatives. 
 
A. Nondelegation  
 
1. Preliminaries. The nondelegation doctrine is widely understood to forbid Congress 
from “delegating” its legislative power. On the standard view, Congress may not grant 
discretionary authority to the executive branch, to independent agencies, or to private parties 
without imposing an “intelligible principle” to constrain that authority.71 An extreme example, 
often given in some form or other to suggest that the standard view must be correct, is a statute 
authorizing the President to do “whatever he deems appropriate to make the United States a 
better nation by his lights.”72 
  
         Congress has never given a public or private institution that degree of discretion, but 
since the beginning of the Republic, it has allowed agencies to exercise a great deal of open-
ended authority.73 Contrary to a widespread view, there is nothing new about legislative grants of 
discretion, and the New Deal did not, with respect to such grants, break new ground.74 For that 
reason, the originalist argument on behalf of the nondelegation doctrine remains controversial 
and contested, with some of the most recent and detailed historical account raising serious 
doubts.75 It is worth underlining that point. As a matter of history, the originalist embrace of the 
nondelegation doctrine is not simple to explain. 
  
For its part, the Supreme Court has shown little enthusiasm for the nondelegation 
doctrine. It is often remarked that the first year in which the Court invoked the doctrine to strike 
down an act of Congress was 1935 (notably, at the height of the New Deal era, when the 
                                                
71 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
72 But see Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 
1741-43 & n.81 (2002) (criticizing the use of this worst-case hypothetical as a premise for formulating 
rules of constitutional law). 
73 See Id. at 1735-36; see generally JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION (2010).  
74 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 72, 1735-36; MASHAW, supra note 73. 
75 See MASHAW, supra note 73, at ix. 
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executive branch and the Court were at war).76 But that was also the last year in which the Court 
invoked the doctrine to strike down an act of Congress. For nearly eighty years since that time, 
the unbroken record of non-use is noteworthy in light of the fact that the Court has had numerous 
opportunities to invoke the doctrine, having dealt with many arguably open-ended grants of 
discretionary authority.77 
  
         Despite the Court’s lack of interest in the nondelegation doctrine, libertarians have long 
shown considerable enthusiasm for it, and have argued vigorously on behalf of its revival.78 
Their suspicion of government power, and their desire to preserve a sphere of private autonomy, 
help to account for that enthusiasm.79 At first glance, however, the libertarian focus on the 
nondelegation doctrine might seem a bit puzzling, because the doctrine is designed to promote 
accountability, whose relationship to libertarian goals is not entirely clear. Through specific 
legislation, Congress might well authorize significant intrusions on private rights as libertarians 
understand them. In such cases, the nondelegation doctrine provides scant comfort. And indeed, 
some statutes do contain clear standards and do intrude on what libertarians regard as private 
rights. 
 
Put in its best light, libertarian enthusiasm for the nondelegation doctrine can be 
explained in the following terms. Suppose that we believe (with Judge Brown, among many 
others) that a central goal of the Constitution is to safeguard private liberty, and to do so by 
constraining the influence of private factions. If so, then there is a plausible argument on behalf 
of the nondelegation doctrine as a way of achieving that goal. It might well be thought that by 
requiring members of Congress to surmount the difficulty of agreeing on a specific form of 
words, and by forbidding legislation that lacks such agreement, the nondelegation doctrine 
reduces the likelihood that law will be enacted at all.80 If national law itself is seen as potentially 
threatening to liberty, this constraint will seem appealing. A supplemental idea is that whenever 
Congress gives discretionary authority to the executive branch, it unleashes a risk of interest-
group capture.81 The safeguards that are built into the structure of the national legislature serve to 
reduce that risk. When Congress grants open-ended discretionary power to others, it allows those 
safeguards to be evaded. 
  
         With these understandings, the libertarian enthusiasm for the nondelegation doctrine 
ceases to be a mystery.  But there is a further puzzle, both because the nondelegation doctrine 
                                                
76 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
77 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001); see generally Id. at 
474 (citing cases).  
78 See, e.g., Christopher Demuth, OIRA At Thirty, 63 ADMIN.L. REV. 15, 17-21 (2011); Douglas H. 
Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 251-
264 (2010). 
79 See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36-37, 63-67 (1982). 
80 See Id. at 63-65. 
81 See Id. at 63-67. 
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would block open-ended delegations of discretion to deregulate, and because constraining 
delegations at the federal level does nothing to prevent liberty-restricting regulation at the state 
level. As to the former issue, many libertarian arguments in favor of the nondelegation doctrine 
tacitly assume the baseline of 1789, a baseline that no longer exists. In a world already chock-full 
of federal regulation, it might be worthwhile for libertarians to consider the possibility that 
administrative discretion to deregulate – and self-conscious deregulation did occur in the 1980s 
and 1990s in some regulated industries, and has occurred periodically since that time -- should be 
promoted, not hampered. 
 
As to the latter issue, the libertarian view must also come to terms with the complexity of 
the federal system, in which vigorous affirmative federal lawmaking may well be necessary -- 
and has historically often been necessary -- to prevent local oppression that is itself deeply 
objectionable on libertarian premises, or ought to be. Jim Crow was not a libertarian policy. By 
raising the barriers to the enactment of federal legislation, the nondelegation doctrine might 
make it more difficult for the national government to protect against intrusions on liberty by the 
states. Perhaps the libertarian view, rightly conceived, is that the nondelegation doctrine 
generally protects against unjustified intrusions on liberty, and that it does little to restrict 
liberty-protecting, state-controlling action at the national level, especially if the Constitution is 
taken to create independent barriers to intrusions on liberty at the state level.  
 
2. Doctrinal departures. Our principal goal here is to outline the libertarian argument, not 
to evaluate it. For present purposes, the important point is that the D.C. Circuit has twice 
developed its own nondelegation doctrine, operating independently of the Supreme Court’s, and 
in the face of that Court’s noticeable lack of enthusiasm for that doctrine.  
 
The first forays occurred in the 1990s, when the court, quite remarkably, raised serious 
constitutional doubts about central provisions of both the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
and the Clean Air Act.82 The court relied on two different ideas. The first was that if Congress 
failed to impose real bounds on agency discretion – in the form of floors and ceilings that were 
not too far apart – it would run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.83 The second idea was that in 
the face of an otherwise unconstitutional grant of discretion, agencies could solve the problem by 
adopting clear rules that would constrain their own discretion.84 
  
                                                
82 Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (ATA) (holding that 
EPA’s construction of §§ 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 938 F.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Lockout/Tagout I) (holding 
that OSHA’s construction of its organic statute was an unreasonable construction “in light of 
nondelegation principles”). 
83 See ATA, 175 F.3d at 1034; Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1316-17. 
84 ATA, 175 F.3d at 1038; Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1313. 
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         If the Supreme Court had not rejected them in emphatic terms,85 both of these ideas could 
have turned out to be exceedingly important. As the court’s rulings suggested, the first might 
well throw a great deal of modern legislation into serious doubt. If the nondelegation doctrine 
threatens core provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Clean Air Act – 
arguably, in fact, the core provisions – then there is little doubt that it threatens many regulatory 
statutes, in a way that fits well with the libertarian agenda. The second idea, by contrast, provides 
a kind of lifeline to agencies, authorizing them to “solve” the nondelegation problem by cabining 
their own discretion. From the standpoint of libertarian aspirations, the lifeline is nothing to 
celebrate, and it is constitutionally troublesome to boot. Nonetheless, there are real advantages to 
situations in which agencies are required to cabin their discretion. If they do so, they promote 
clarity and predictability, above all for members of regulated classes, and perhaps that approach 
is a sufficiently satisfactory second-best on libertarian (and other) grounds, or at least an 
improvement over a situation in which agency discretion is not so cabined.86 
  
         The problem is that both of these ideas utterly lacked support in Supreme Court doctrine, 
and hence it was not surprising when a unanimous Court rejected them.87 The Court noted that 
the point of the nondelegation doctrine is to require Congress to offer an intelligible principle, 
and that if it has failed to do so, the problem cannot be cured if the agency itself offers such a 
principle.88 More fundamentally, the Court made plain its lack of enthusiasm for essentially any 
modern use of the nondelegation doctrine. The Court largely relied on its own precedents, 
pointedly quoting its statement to the effect that it has “almost never felt qualified to second-
guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those 
executing or applying the law.”89 The Court added that it had “found an ‘intelligible principle’ in 
various statutes authorizing regulation in the ‘public interest.’”90 After the Court’s unanimous 
decision, it would be fair to say this of the nondelegation doctrine: Dead again. 
  
         But the D.C. Circuit has yet to receive the coroner’s certificate. In an extraordinary 
decision in 2013, on which the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari, the lower court 
invoked a version of the nondelegation doctrine to strike down an important federal statute. 
Association of American Railroads91 involved a provision of the Passenger Rail and Investment 
Improvement Act of 2008, which was designed, among other things, to promote the interests of 
Amtrak, which Congress has long considered to be of central importance to the nation’s railroad 
                                                
85 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-76. 
86 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); see also ATA, 175 
F.3d at 108 (“If the agency develops determinate, binding standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise 
the delegated authority arbitrarily.”). 
87 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-76. 
88 Id. at 472. 
89 Id. at 474-75. 
90 Id. at 474. 
91 Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3533 (U.S. June 23, 2014) (No. 13-1080). 
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system.92 Under federal law, railroads are required to make their tracks available for use by 
Amtrak.93 Under the Act, the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak must jointly “develop 
new or improve existing metrics and minimum standards for measuring the performance and 
service quality of intercity passenger train operations.”94 In the event of disagreement between 
the FRA and Amtrak, either may petition the Surface Transportation Board, which can appoint 
an arbitrator to help the parties to reach agreement through binding arbitration.95  These metrics 
and standards matter, because they help determine whether Amtrak, rather than another rail 
carrier, should be entitled to use the tracks. 
  
         The problem in the case arose when the FRA, working together with Amtrak, issued 
metrics and standards to which the Association of American Railroads objected.96 As a standard 
nondelegation case, the outcome would be simple to resolve. The Act does not give the FRA 
anything like a blank check. In authorizing the agency to develop metrics and minimum 
standards, it provides a series of intelligible principles for the agency to consider.97 For the court, 
however, the key problem lay elsewhere: the fact that the Act effectively delegated public power 
to Amtrak, which the court called a “private” organization.98 For the court, it was as if Congress 
had “given General Motors the power to coauthor, alongside the Department of Transportation, 
regulations that will govern all automobile manufacturers.”99 
  
         In reaching its conclusion, the court broke a good deal of new doctrinal ground. First, it 
asserted that even if Congress set out an intelligible principle, it could not delegate public power 
to private groups. “Even an intelligible principle cannot rescue a statute empowering private 
parties to wield regulatory authority.”100 Second, it ruled that Amtrak is a private corporation.101 
It so ruled notwithstanding several contrary indicators: Amtrak’s Board of Directors includes the 
Secretary of Transportation, seven other presidential appointees, and the President of Amtrak 
(who is appointed by the eight other Board members); the federal government owns all 109 
million shares of Amtrak’s preferred stock; and without congressional largesse, Amtrak would 
face financial ruin.102 In addition, the Supreme Court had itself ruled, without the slightest 
ambiguity, that Amtrak “is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment,”103 and 
hence that Amtrak is a state actor at least for those constitutional purposes. 
                                                
92 Id. at 668-69. 
93 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 24308). 
94 Id. at 669 (quoting Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (“PRIIA”), Pub.L. No. 110–
432, § 207(a) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24101 (note))). 
95 Id. (quoting PRIIA, § 207(d) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24101 (note))). 
96 Id. at 669-70. 
97 See Id. at 674 (“[I]f [Amtrak] is just one more government agency—then the regulatory power it wields 
under § 207 is of no constitutional moment.”). 
98 Id. at 668. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 671. 
101 Id. at 677. 
102 Id. at 674. 
103 Id. at 676 (quoting Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995)). 
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         To escape the force of these points, the court emphasized what it took to be first 
principles. In its view, “delegating the government’s powers to private parties saps our political 
system of democratic accountability,” and such delegations are “particularly perilous” in view of 
the fact “the belief that disinterested government agencies ostensibly look to the public good, not 
private gain.”104 Under the Act, Amtrak is given “a distinct competitive advantage,” in the form 
of an ability to limit “the freight railroads’ exercise of their property rights over an essential 
resource.”105 For this reason, the corporation might devise “metrics and standards that inure to its 
own financial benefit rather than the common good.”106 
  
         Some of these abstractions have force, but it is hard to resist the conclusion that the court 
is engaging in a kind of free-form doctrine-building, with a distinctive libertarian cast. Congress 
has undoubtedly made a judgment -- indeed a repeated series of judgments, over decades -- that 
Amtrak itself is in the national interest, perhaps because Amtrak reduces congestion on the roads 
and in the air, perhaps because it creates external benefits of other kinds (such as reduction of air 
pollution) or perhaps because it has cultural benefits. In support of that fundamental judgment, 
Congress funds Amtrak, creates a special structure of government oversight for it, and also 
allowed it to play a part in producing metrics and standards. Indeed Congress itself made a 
deliberate, considered choice to build in an advantage for Amtrak, a priority over competitors. 
The court did not adequately describe, or perhaps simply found objectionable, the very point of 
the statutory scheme. It is not as though that statutory scheme was itself created by Amtrak; 
rather it was created by “presumptively disinterested”107 public officials, namely legislators, who 
believed that giving Amtrak a preferred legal position would itself create desirable incentives for 
enforcement of a scheme that those legislators found socially desirable overall. 
 
In any event, and perhaps most fundamentally, the priority for Amtrak is hardly 
unbounded; Amtrak is constrained in multiple ways, and under the Act, there is no grant of open-
ended discretion to make law and policy. The Act specifies relevant factors, thus limiting any 
capacity for self-dealing;108 judicial review is available both for consistency with law and for 
arbitrariness;109 the FRA must agree;110 in the face of disagreement, Amtrak cannot prevail, but 
must submit to arbitration.111 In Association of American Railroads itself, moreover, there was 
no disagreement between FRA and Amtrak. 
  
                                                
104 Id. at 675. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 676. 
107 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), which objects to delegations to private persons, 
distinguishing them from delegations to “presumptively disinterested” public officials. 
108 PRIIA, § 207(a). 
109 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
110 PRIIA, § 207(a). 
111 Id. 
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         We should be able to accept the proposition that Congress cannot delegate adjudicatory 
authority to an interested party, at least if that adjudication directly affects protected interests in 
liberty or property. That proposition is entrenched in current doctrine – under the rubric of the 
due process clause,112 not the nondelegation doctrine. Insofar as rulemaking is involved, 
whatever process Congress provides is due process, and the due process clause drops out as a 
separate constraint113 (as the court of appeals seemed to misunderstand114). We can appreciate 
the view that in light of the risk of interest-group power, a grant of rulemaking authority to 
private groups might create more serious objections than an equivalent grant to a public agency. 
But that was not the situation in Association of American Railroads. The court’s decision is best 
seen as a new effort to reanimate a dead doctrine, an effort rooted not in existing rulings but in 
abstractions from one (controversial) reading of constitutional and political theory, evidently 
connected with the views that we traced in Part I. The Supreme Court’s decision, expected next 
Term, is an opportunity to bring home the message that the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly failed to 
hear: at least outside of very extreme circumstances, invalidation on nondelegation grounds is 
not a permissible move in administrative law. 
 
B. Commercial Speech and Disclosure 
 
 First amendment cases are typically treated as part of constitutional law, not 
administrative law, and for good reason. The principal free speech doctrines grew out of cases 
that involved political dissent, and that had nothing to do with administrative law as such.115 But 
in the modern era, regulatory policy often involves speech, and in particular often involves 
efforts to regulate or to compel disclosure.116 It would be possible, of course, to deem such 
efforts to be “arbitrary or capricious” under the APA, or to invade the constitutionally protected 
property rights of regulated firms. But those two avenues are more costly for judges; in 
particular, as we will see, the Circuit’s aggressive use of arbitrariness review on the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has drawn increasing scrutiny.117 Thus in some of the key cases, the 
Circuit has invoked principles that protect “commercial speech.”118 And in so doing, it has 
                                                
112 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
113 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bo. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
114 Am. Railroads, 721 F.3d at 675 (citing due process precedents in support of its nondelegation 
holding).  
115 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment a state statute that criminalized mere advocacy and assembly to advocate while failing to 
distinguishing mere advocacy from incitement to imminent lawless action). 
116 For general discussion, see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
117 See infra Part 2.D. 
118 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Nat'l Ass'n of 
Mfrs. v. S.E.C., No. 13-5252, 2014 WL 1408274, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 14, 2014) (Conflict 
Minerals Case). Note: Professor Sunstein worked on the underlying regulation while serving as 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs during the first term of the Obama 
Administration. 
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imposed a kind of libertarian administrative law on regulators who are responding to 
unambiguous congressional mandates.  
 
A key example involves graphic warnings on cigarette packages. Congress explicitly 
called for such warnings from the FDA,119 which imposed them after an extensive rulemaking 
process.120 In a decision conflating political speech and commercial advertising,121 the court 
struck down those warnings. In an opinion by Judge Brown, the court began as if it was 
protecting political dissenters: “Both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
‘complementary components of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind’ protected by 
the First Amendment.”122 Carefully navigating its way through the precedents, the court said that 
the “inflammatory images . . . cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey 
information to consumers. They are unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps 
embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.”123 
 
Remarkably, the court invalidated the warnings on the ground that the “FDA has not 
provided a shred of evidence—much less the ‘substantial evidence’ required by the APA—
showing that the graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its interest in reducing the number of 
Americans who smoke.”124 Offering its own view of the record – a view inconsistent with that of 
many experts, who have studied the matter in detail125 – the court concluded that the rule must be 
struck down because the FDA offered “no evidence showing that such warnings have directly 
caused a material decrease in smoking rates in any of the countries that now require them.”126 
The FDA’s evidence, coming largely from reductions in smoking after graphic warnings were 
required in Canada, did involve inferences, rather than a randomized controlled trial.127 But no 
such trial was available to the FDA, and the inferences were very much of the kind that lie at the 
core of administrators’ competence. As we will see when we discuss arbitrariness review -- and 
the “commercial speech” cases are to a large degree arbitrariness review under a more 
impressive constitutional rubric -- the Supreme Court has recently, and pointedly, warned lower 
courts not to interfere with agencies’ prerogative to draw unprovable causal and empirical 
inferences under conditions of uncertainty.128 
 
                                                
119 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub.L. No. 111–31, § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1776, 
1842-45 (2009) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333).  
120 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).  
121 Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d 1205. 
122 Id. at 1211. 
123 Id. at 1216-17. 
124 Id. at 1219. 
125 A valuable discussion is Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech,  169 J. 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 53 (2013). See also 696 F.3d at 1225 (Rogers, J., dissenting) 
(citing 76 Fed.Reg. at 36,696–97) (explaining that the FDA’s reliance on graphic warnings is based on 
findings “well-established in the scientific literature”). 
126 Id. at 1219.  
127 See id. at 1219-20 (discussing the Canadian study).  
128 See infra Part 2.D. 
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In a similarly but even more aggressively libertarian ruling,129 the court struck down an 
SEC regulation,130 mandated -- not merely authorized -- by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act,131 which was designed to require disclosure of the origin of 
“conflict minerals.”132 The specific goal of the statute is to require disclosure of materials that 
come from the Democratic Republic of Congo.133 The National Association of Manufacturers 
challenged the requirement that an issuer describe its products as not “DRC conflict free” in the 
report it files with the Commission and must post on its website. Burdens on commercial speech 
are ordinarily given “intermediate scrutiny.”134 In striking down the implementing regulation, the 
court seemed to apply something close to strict scrutiny, even though the disclosure requirements 
involved mere matters of fact, and nothing graphic. Its chief objection was that the SEC had not 
provided “evidence that less restrictive means would fail.”135  
 
What the court sought was not “the ‘conflict free’ description the statute and rule 
require,” but instead a looser legal regime, in which “issuers could use their own language to 
describe their products, or the government could compile its own list of products that it believes 
are affiliated with the Congo war, based on information the issuers submit to the 
Commission.”136 Under one version of this regime, the SEC would not regulate speech, but 
would compile its own information about affiliated products, and make the resulting list 
available to consumers and investors. In the court’s judgment, this approach could be equally 
effective, and indeed “a centralized list compiled by the Commission in one place may even be 
more convenient or trustworthy to investors and consumers.“137 What the court required was 
“evidence” that the alternative would not work. In the process, the court objected that the “label 
‘conflict free’ is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an 
issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance 
armed groups.”138  
 
In general, it is certainly reasonable to ask for evidence, and intermediate scrutiny can be 
read to require it. But in this context, what would such evidence look like? The scheme of 
                                                
129 Conflict Minerals Case, 2014 WL 1408274. (The case is also titled National Association of 
Manufacturers v. SEC, F.3d (April 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/D3B5DAF947A03F2785257CBA0053AEF8/$file/13-
5252-1488184.pdf) 
130 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274, 56,277–78 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p–
1, 249b.400). 
131 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.L. No. 111–203, § 
1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p), 78m note (‘Conflict Minerals')). 
132 Conflict Minerals Case, 2014 WL 1408274, at *8-11. 
133 See Id. at *1. 
134 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 
(1980). 
135 Conflict Minerals Case, 2014 WL 1408274, at *10. 
136 Id. at *11. 
137 See Id.  
138 See Id. at *7; see also Id. at *11 (“The Commission has failed to explain why (much less provide 
evidence that) [these] intuitive alternatives to regulating speech would be any less effective.”). 
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regulation involved a novel factual setting rife with uncertainty,139 in which a demand for proof 
necessarily dooms the regulation. Under such conditions, Congress thought that it would be 
appropriate, and simplest and most effective, to require companies to make the relevant 
disclosure, perhaps on the entirely reasonable theory that such disclosure would be both highly 
credible and easily accessible, as government disclosure might not be. The intrusion on the 
companies’ legitimate interests would be minimal140 – at least as minimal as in the context of 
nongraphic, and constitutionally acceptable, warnings on cigarette packages. On the court’s own 
logic, it would not be much of a stretch to suggest that those very warnings violate the first 
amendment. 
 
These are first amendment cases, to be sure, but they belong squarely in the world of 
(libertarian) administrative law, because they raise grave questions about compulsory disclosure, 
which is an increasingly popular (and minimally intrusive) regulatory tool. One of the ironies of 
these decisions is that they suggest that the court will use constitutional artillery against 
disclosure requirements, while having to resort to more modest sub-constitutional principles to 
strike down mandates and bans. In any case, the libertarian underpinnings of the relevant 
decisions are unmistakable. These “free speech” decisions use a form of aggressive review of 
administrators’ causal and evidentiary judgments. Such an approach is, plausibly, a substitute for 
grounds of review -- such as substantive due process protection of property rights, or stringent 
arbitrariness review under the APA -- that are either off-limits in the current constitutional 
regime, or else far more difficult to justify, as we will discuss when we examine the Circuit’s 
recent jurisprudence on arbitrariness. 
 
C. Interpretive Rules 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act recognizes the existence of two kinds of rules: 
legislative rules, which are generally a product of formal (“on the record”) or informal (not “on 
the record”) rulemaking processes, and interpretive rules, which agencies may issue without 
invoking such processes.141 If an agency wishes to publish an interpretive rule tomorrow, 
offering its understanding of what its organic statute or its own prior legislative rule means, it is 
entitled to do so (although there is a separate question whether that rule will receive the 
deference accorded to legislative rules under Chevron, some other kind of deference, or no 
deference at all).142 It is agreed that agencies cannot change legislative rules simply by issuing 
                                                
139 Dodd-Frank, § 1502 (characterizing the “emergency humanitarian situation” in the Congo as one of 
“extreme levels of violence”). 
140 See Conflict Minerals Case, 2014 WL 1408274, at *11.  
141 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Where “good cause” or certain other exceptions are present, agencies may issue 
legislative rules without formal or informal rulemaking process. See Id. at § 553(a)-(b). 
142 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 414 (1945)) (interpretative rule interpreting the agency’s own regulations is  “controlling unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-69 (2006) 
(interpretative rule, which interprets a regulation that merely restates the terms of a statute, and that was 
not promulgated in exercise of Congressionally delegated authority, is entitled to Skidmore deference). 
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interpretive rules; any such change must be preceded by some kind of process (typically notice-
and-comment).143 On these questions, the APA is straightforward. 
 
 But what if an agency rescinds an interpretive rule and replaces it with a new interpretive 
rule? Suppose that the Department of Labor issues a legislative rule at Time 1 (say, 1999), then 
issues an interpretive rule at Time 2 (say, 2008) to clarify its understanding of its own prior 
legislative rule. Then at Time 3 (say, 2015), the Department rescinds the old interpretation and 
issues a new interpretive rule, perhaps reflecting changed circumstances, perhaps reflecting a 
new assessment of relevant facts, perhaps reflecting the values of a new Administration. Must 
the new interpretive rule be preceded by some kind of APA process? 
 
 The correct answer is straightforwardly “no.” The APA does not require any such 
process. It authorizes agencies to issue interpretive rules immediately and without notice-and-
comment or any other kind of process.144 It is hard to imagine more explicit text than 
§553(b)(3)(A), which states that “this subsection” -- i.e. the requirement of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking -- “does not apply - (A) to interpretative rules….”145 If courts required a notice-and-
comment process for interpretive rules that revise previous interpretive rules, they would be 
imposing a procedural requirement beyond those contained in the APA – a clear violation of the 
restrictions explicitly laid down in Vermont Yankee. 
 
 Nonetheless, the DC Circuit has spoken unambiguously: Agencies must use notice-and-
comment procedures in order to change interpretive rules that construe the agency’s own prior 
legislative rules, at least so long as the agency previously took a definitive position.146 In 
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,147 the court concluded that so long as the 
original interpretive rule was “authoritatively adopted,”148 the agency could not change it without 
a full notice-and-comment process.149 The court squarely rejected the government’s argument 
that “an agency is completely free to change its interpretation of an ambiguous regulation so long 
as the regulation reasonably will bear the second interpretation.”150 
                                                
143 See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“If the rule cannot 
fairly be seen as interpreting a statute or a regulation, and if . . . it is enforced, the rule is not an 
interpretive rule exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.”) 
144 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).  
145 Id. 
146 The decisions seem to say, in dictum, that the logic does not extend to interpretive rules that construe 
the underlying statute itself, rather than a prior legislative rule. See, e.g., Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n, Inc. 
v. F.A.A., 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“an agency has less leeway in its choice of the method 
of changing its interpretation of its regulations than in altering its construction of a statute”). It is not clear, 
however, why the logic should stop short in this manner, and the issue has not been squarely presented. 
147 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
148 Id. at 587. 
149 Id. at 586 (“Once an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation 
as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.”). 
150 Id. at 586. The court went on to uphold the interpretation because it was not inconsistent with any prior 
interpretation. See Id. at 588. Although on one view that makes the announced rule dictum, on another 
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The court has asserted the basic principle in a series of cases, and after a brief wobble has 
actually reaffirmed and strengthened the principle in an important recent decision. The wobble 
occurred in 2009, when the court gave an apparent signal that it would at least qualify the 
principle, suggesting the possibility that those who would invoke Paralyzed Veterans would have 
to show that significant reliance interests were at stake.151 With this signal, the court indicated 
that a showing of reliance interests might amount to a separate requirement, independent of the 
requirement that the original interpretive rule be definitive.152 But in 2013, in Mortgage Bankers 
Association v. Harris,153 the court unambiguously reaffirmed the Paralyzed Veterans principle, 
ruling that definitiveness is the sole requirement, and that reliance is relevant only insofar as it 
might inform the question of definitiveness.154  
 
Mortgage Bankers invalidated an interpretive rule from the Obama Administration, 
which would have expressed a more expansive view of the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act than had been announced by the Bush Administration.155 The court stated the rule plainly: 
“Once a court has classified an agency interpretation as such, it cannot be significantly revised 
without notice and comment rulemaking.”156 And in explaining the practical effect of that rule, 
the court said that it “may very well serve as a prophylactic that discourages agencies from 
attempting to circumvent notice and comment requirements in the first instance.”157 Similarly, in 
an earlier case in the sequence, the court said that “[w]hen an agency has given its regulation a 
definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in 
effect amended its rule, something it may not accomplish without notice and comment.”158 
 
 In terms of standard legal sources, the court’s approach is exceedingly difficult to defend. 
It is question-begging to say that in such situations, agencies are attempting to “circumvent 
notice and comment requirements”; the question is whether there are such requirements when 
agencies change their interpretive rules, and the answer is that there aren’t. The court did refer to 
“the belief that a definitive interpretation is so closely intertwined with the regulation that a 
                                                                                                                                                       
view it does not; and in any event the court has applied the rule in a number of later cases. See, e.g., 
Alaska Prof’l Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1033-36. 
151  MetWest Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 511 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
152 See Id. at 511 (“A fundamental rationale of Alaska Professional Hunters was the affected parties' 
substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-established agency interpretation.”); Id. at 511 n.4 (“This is a 
crucial part of the analysis. To ignore it is to misunderstand Alaska Professional Hunters . . . .”). 
153 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3533 (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-1041), and Nickols v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 82 U.S.L.W. 3533 
(U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-1052). One of us (Vermeule) is a signatory to an amicus brief, on behalf of 
72 administrative law scholars, in support of the certiorari petition in the case. See Brief for Administrative 
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, -- S. Ct. -- 
(2013) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052), 2014 WL 1275189. 
154 See Mortgage Bankers, 720 F.3d at 970.  
155 See Id. at 968. 
156 Id. at 971. 
157 Id. at 969 n.4. 
158 Alaska Prof’l Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034. 
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significant change to the former constitutes a repeal or amendment of the latter.”159 But that 
belief is wrong. An interpretation issued at Time 1 can be definitive, in the (limited) sense that it 
certainly reflects the agency’s current considered view, while also lacking the force of law (as 
interpretive rules do), and without becoming merged or intertwined with the underlying 
regulation -- a mystical notion in any event. Likewise with the notion that the revised 
interpretation “in effect” amends the underlying legislative rule -- a notion that collapses the 
APA’s clear distinction between rulemaking and rule-interpreting.160 
 
There is an analogy here to the Chevron doctrine,161 where a recurring question has been 
whether agencies’ initial interpretations of statutes are frozen, or instead may be changed by 
subsequent interpretations, and if so by what procedure. In that setting, recent decisions of the 
Court have been emphatic, and have settled the issue: new agency interpretations are not in any 
way disfavored, and no extra burdens of justification are placed on those interpretations. In 
Brand X,162 the Court held not only that agencies may freely change their interpretations as far as 
Chevron is concerned, but also that those new interpretations will oust prior contrary judicial 
interpretations, so long as the relevant statutes contains a gap or ambiguity.163 And in FCC v. 
Fox,164 the Court rejected the notion that arbitrariness review requires agencies to give special 
additional justifications for a change of interpretation, over and above the baseline obligation to 
justify the new interpretation itself.165 The doctrinal context p of Paralyzed Veterans and 
Mortgage Bankers v. Harris is slightly different, of course, but the larger point is that the D.C. 
Circuit’s law-freezing approach is not in step with the underlying premises of the Court’s 
emphatic recent pronouncements. 
 
In this light, the Paralyzed Veterans rule is best seen as a form of federal common law 
that goes beyond, or that is even contrary to, the Supreme Court’s own decisions – as the Court 
will have an opportunity to make perfectly clear when it takes up Mortgage Bankers next Term. 
The rule is a throwback to the era before Vermont Yankee, in which lower courts, and above all 
                                                
159 Mortgage Bankers, 720 F.3d at 969 n.3. 
160 In Alaska Prof’l Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034, the panel seemed to argue that because the APA’s 
definition of rulemaking includes agency action that “modifies” a rule, see 5 U.S.C. 551(5), it follows that 
“[w]hen an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that 
interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something it may not accomplish without notice 
and comment.” This too is question-begging, however; the court is assuming the conclusion by saying 
that the revised interpretation is in effect an amendment. As far as the APA is concerned, it is a revised 
interpretation, and not an amendment at all. The court seems to be confusing two ideas: (1) an 
interpretation is “definitive” in the sense that the agency is committed to it; (2) an interpretation is 
“definitive” in the sense that it has the force of law. An interpretive rule can lawfully be definitive in the 
former sense without becoming a legislative rule (which must be preceded by notice-and-comment). 
161 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
162 Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
163 See Id. at 982. 
164 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
165 Id. at 514. 
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the DC Circuit, developed constraints on agency action that had little or nothing to do with the 
APA and far more to do with the courts’ own judgments about appropriate restrictions.  
 
What underlies that approach? What is motivating it? We cannot say that the answer is 
necessarily libertarian at a conceptual level. In the abstract, the Paralyzed Veterans rule has a 
degree of neutrality. If, for example, the Clinton Administration issued an expansive 
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Bush Administration would be forbidden to 
change it without notice and comment. But there is nonetheless a clear connection with 
libertarian principles. Largely out of solicitude for the reliance interests of regulated entities, who 
often have the most at stake when interpretive rules are changed, the court seems to be 
attempting to promote predictability and consistency on the part of agencies, prompting the court 
to impose on agencies a kind of stare decisis principle, even for their own nonbinding 
interpretations. The idea seems to be that because agencies exercise discretionary power, and are 
vulnerable to the power of well-organized private groups (the public choice problem), agency 
interpretations must be taken as binding at least on agencies themselves, until they are changed 
through notice and comment procedures. Though reliance on the part of the regulated class is not 
an independent requirement, it does seem to drive the court’s reasoning, as indicated that its 
suggestion that “regulated entities are unlikely to substantially — and often cannot be said to 
justifiably — rely on agency pronouncements lacking some or all the hallmarks of a definitive 
interpretation,” and hence “significant reliance functions as a rough proxy for definitiveness.”166 
 
 As a matter of doctrine, this reasoning is a bit of a mess. The court is conflating the issue 
of reliance on interpretive rules with the separate question whether the rule is “definitive.” The 
APA does require that so-called “legislative” rules -- which if valid have the force of law and 
thus bind both the agency and all the world -- must go through notice and comment procedures. 
But it expressly exempts “interpretative” rules from this requirement,167 and any rule that counts 
as interpretive may be changed without notice and comment, as far as the APA is concerned. 
There is an elaborate body of law that sorts legislative rules from interpretive rules,168 but that 
body of law was agreed by all concerned to be irrelevant in these cases; the court’s position is 
not that the relevant rule was actually legislative.169 Rather the court’s position is that even 
though the rule is concededly interpretive, it may be changed only through notice-and-comment 
procedures -- an additional, judge-made requirement that the APA nowhere contains. 
 
                                                
166 Mortgage Bankers, 720 F.3d at 970. 
167 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
168 See, e.g., Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (four-
part test for distinguishing legislative from interpretative rules); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 
1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205, 
208-09 (4th Cir. 1989); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996). 
169 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 587-88 (characterizing the analysis of whether the rule was 
a legislative rule as “independent” of the analysis of whether the change in interpretation required notice 
and comment). 
29 
Furthermore, the court failed to recognize that reliance and its reasonableness are at least 
partly endogenous – products of the legal rules themselves. Knowing that interpretive rules need 
not be changed by notice-and-comment procedures, regulated entities should discount their 
reliance accordingly. If they do not, it is unclear why their unjustified reliance ought to constrain 
the agency’s legal choices. What counts as justified reliance is ultimately itself an endogenous 
product of the law, at least in part, rather than something that just happens extra-legally, 
especially when the regulated parties are legally sophisticated firms.   
 
The most promising justification for the court’s conclusion might be that it is arbitrary 
and capricious to change a reliance-inducing interpretive rule without full notice and comment. 
Perhaps agencies act without rational foundation when they casually, without rigorous process, 
change interpretations on which regulated entities have (justifiably?) relied. But there are two 
difficulties with this attempt to justify the court’s approach, even apart from the issue of the 
endogeneity of reliance. One is that the court nowhere articulates an arbitrariness rationale for its 
rule -- perhaps because such a rationale implies that agencies need only give an adequate reason 
for refusing to use notice and comment when changing an interpretive rule. The court, of course, 
wants to impose a mandatory procedural requirement of notice and comment, not a mere 
obligation to give reasons for the agency’s procedural choices. Second, and related no doubt, 
agencies will often have perfectly valid reasons to decline to use notice and comment to change 
interpretive rules. Precisely because those rules are not legally binding, agencies may see the 
benefits of additional procedures as low, while the time and cost of a notice and comment 
proceeding are frequently nontrivial. While the adequacy of these agency justifications cannot be 
evaluated in the abstract, they are quite likely to be sufficient in many cases. 
 
The APA does not require agencies to use notice and comment to alter interpretive rules, 
whether or not they are definitive (and whether or not they induce reliance). Nor could the court 
possibly say that non-definitive interpretive rules could be changed only through notice and 
comment procedures. Any such rules should count as lawful interpretive rules or perhaps as 
general policy statements, lacking any kind of binding effect. No one argues that general policy 
statements statements cannot be altered in the absence of notice and comment. The court must be 
insisting that regulated entities can substantially and justifiably rely on definitive interpretations, 
even if those interpretations lack the force of law.  But if this is true, it is only because the court 
has so held, in a bootstrapped doctrinal development that can be fairly described as lacking legal 
foundations. 
 
D. Arbitrariness Review 
 
 In the era of progressive administrative law that pre-dated, and provoked, Vermont 
Yankee, certain agencies were highly vulnerable. Chief among these was the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (née the Atomic Energy Commission), which became a punching-bag for judges on 
the D.C. Circuit concerned about the health and environmental risks of nuclear power, and 
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convinced that the congressionally-specified procedures for NRC rulemaking offered inadequate 
protection from those risks.170 The Supreme Court’s rebuke to the D.C. Circuit in Vermont 
Yankee made both a general point that judges lack authority to require agencies to employ 
procedures over and above the procedures mandated by constitutional or statutory command,171 
and also a more specific point: that the Circuit’s systematically skeptical stance towards nuclear 
power was unacceptable, in light of Congress’ consistent policy and contrary instructions.172 
 
 Today’s disfavored agency is the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Straightforwardly, a series of recent decisions from the D.C. Circuit,173 culminating in the 
Business Roundtable case,174 suggest that the SEC ought not to be able to institute new 
regulation of securities markets and corporate affairs unless the Commission provides either a 
full quantified cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that the regulation is net-beneficial, or else 
explains why quantification is impossible.175 Moreover, the lower court has questioned whether 
the SEC may regulate in the face of "mixed evidence" about the benefits of regulation.176 To be 
sure, the cases are not uniform. A recent decision, involving not the SEC but the CFTC, 
seemingly reins in the burgeoning caselaw a bit,177 perhaps in reaction to the widespread 
criticism the court has received for Business Roundtable.178 But the decisions involving the NRC 
(AEC) were hardly uniform either,179 and if anything, the SEC may well have lost cases more 
consistently than did the NRC. Indeed then-Professor Scalia, writing in the late 1970s, suggested 
that the Circuit had tacked back and forth in its NRC decisions, delivering mixed results and 
                                                
170 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  
171 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. 
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agency action.”) 
173 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. 
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174 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
175 See Id. at 1148-49. 
176 See Id. at 1151. 
177 Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
178 See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law & Economics of Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2012) (criticizing Business Roundtable  as a judicial 
“misapplication of law and economic principles”); Case Comment, D.C. Circuit Finds Sec Proxy Access 
Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1095 (2012) (criticizing Business Roundtable as “impos[ing] unattainable standards 
that bar agency action”); Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for Sec Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
30 YALE J. REG. 289, 293 (2013) (calling Business Roundtable’s criticism of SEC’s empirical economic 
analysis “unfounded”). 
179 Compare, e.g., Citizens for Safe Power, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 524 F.2d 1291, 1301 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding NRC’s issuance of an operating license for a nuclear plant and not requiring 
the agency to implement additional procedures), with NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d at 653 (reversing NRC’s 
issuance of an operating license and requiring the agency to implement additional procedures).  
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ambiguous rationales, in order to present a smaller target for intervention by the Supreme 
Court.180 
 
 The relevant line of decisions began, at the latest, with Chamber of Commerce v. SEC181 
in 2005. The SEC required that “in order to engage in certain transactions otherwise prohibited 
by the [Investment Company Act], an investment company — commonly referred to as a mutual 
fund — must have a board (1) with no less than 75% independent directors and (2) an 
independent chairman.”182 The panel -- in an opinion by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, whose views 
on the “Constitution in Exile” we have seen earlier, and who would later author Business 
Roundtable -- invalidated the regulation on the ground that the agency had declared certain costs 
unquantifiable. The agency had discussed the costs, explained the attendant uncertainty, and 
stated that it had no reliable basis for estimating the costs quantitatively, but decided to proceed 
on the basis of an overall judgment that the regulation would do more good than harm.183 The 
panel, in an ambiguous discussion, seemed to suggest that the agency had a statutory duty to 
make “tough choices” by “hazarding a guess”184 and “do[ing] what it can.”185 This seemed to 
require a quantified guesstimate, insofar as feasible.186 The legal basis for this judicially-imposed 
requirement, however, was left unstated. As we will see shortly, Chamber of Commerce v. SEC 
was a first effort in the direction of the obligation eventually imposed, in a more general form, by 
Business Roundtable -- a presumptive agency obligation to quantify costs and benefits insofar as 
possible. 
 
Also aggressive, but with somewhat different concerns, was the decision in American 
Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC,187 decided in 2010 and written by Judge Sentelle. 
The panel invalidated the SEC’s attempt to define an “annuity contract” for purposes of the 
federal securities laws in a way that extended the protections of those laws; the panel reasoned 
that the agency had failed adequately to consider the effects on “efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”188 The panel’s principal rationale, as pertinent here, was that the SEC had 
failed to consider whether there were sufficient protections for investors under the extant state-
law regime, and had thus failed to show that new regulation was necessary.189 The relevant 
statutes, however, said nothing at all to suggest that the SEC had to consider whether -- assuming 
                                                
180 See Scalia, supra note 2, at 372 (“The pattern of dicta, alternate holdings, and confused holdings out 
of which the D.C. Circuit's principle of APA hybrid rulemaking so clearly and authoritatively emerged had 
the effect, if not the purpose, of assuring compliance below while avoiding accountability above”); see Id. 
at 372-75. 
181 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
182 Id. at 136. 
183 See Id. at 142-44. 
184 Id. at 143. 
185 Id. at 144. 
186 See Coates, supra note 173, at 24-26. 
187 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
188 Id. at 167-68. 
189 See Id. at 178. 
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the regulation were otherwise justified in light of “efficiency” and “competition” -- state law was 
already sufficient.190 The panel injected a note of federalism into statutes that had seemed to have 
other concerns altogether. 
 
 Business Roundtable, decided in 2011, went farther than any of its predecessors by 
imposing a presumptive obligation to perform quantified cost-benefit analysis. The case involved 
the question of “proxy access” in corporate shareholder voting -- whether the proxy materials 
sent to shareholder-voters by publicly traded firms must include nominees of the shareholders, or 
may instead be confined to the slate of nominees designated by the incumbent directors.191 In a 
2009 rulemaking, the SEC elected to require shareholder proxy access, and accompanied its 
decision with a lengthy cost-benefit analysis that considered effects on efficiency, competition 
and capital formation.192 Not all of the elements of the analysis were quantified, however; the 
SEC clearly noted that some of those elements were uncertain, in the sense that available 
information did not suffice to conduct a quantified cost-benefit analysis.193 As to those issues, the 
SEC simply discussed the relevant considerations and resolved the issues through an exercise of 
expert judgment about the balance of advantages. It is worth quoting a specimen of the SEC’s 
own words, which do not appear in the Business Roundtable opinion: 
 
We also recognize the possibility that certain quantifiable benefits for 
shareholders, such as a nominating shareholder’s or group’s savings in the direct costs of 
printing and mailing proxy materials, may be less than the quantifiable costs for a 
company subject to the new rules. We note, however, that the benefits of the new rules 
are not limited to those that are quantifiable (such as the direct savings in printing and 
mailing costs) and instead include benefits that are not as easily quantifiable (such as the 
possibility of greater shareholder participation and communication in the director 
nomination process), as discussed below. We believe that these benefits, collectively, 
justify the costs of the new rules.194  
 
Along the way, the SEC discussed the state of the empirical evidence, examining dozens 
of studies in peer-reviewed journals of economics and finance.195 It concluded that the evidence 
was mixed, that a number of the studies had methodological flaws, and that uncertainty afflicted 
                                                
190 The statute that the court relied on to strike down the SEC Rule, see Id. at 177 (citing §2(b) of the 
amended Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)), requires the SEC to consider “whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” but makes no mention of existing state law. 
191 See 647 F.3d at 261-63.  
192 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (proposed June 18, 2009). The 
final rule is Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
193 See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56,761/1).  
194 75 Fed. Reg. 56755/2-3 (emphasis added). 
195 See generally 75 Fed. Reg. 56753 et seq. (discussing the agency’s cost-benefit analysis); see also 
Brief of Respondent, Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10–1305), 2011 WL 2014799, at *13 
(summarizing studies consulted by the agency). 
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the whole topic.196 Yet the Commission ultimately found most persuasive a cluster of studies 
suggesting that proxy access rules would discipline incumbent management and thus enhance 
shareholder value.197  
 
On the petition for review, the challengers, the Business Roundtable, ignored some of the 
relevant empirical issues and focused on a series of other claims198 -- probably in the belief that 
on any ordinary approach to burdens of proof and standards of review in administrative law, the 
SEC must prevail, given the uncertainty and conflicting state of the evidence. After all, the 
Supreme Court has been very clear that lower courts are to afford maximum deference to 
agencies’ expert judgments on questions at the research frontier, questions as to which scientific 
methods are unable to provide conclusive evidence one way or another.199 In 2009, two years 
before Business Roundtable, FCC v. Fox had warned that “[i]t is one thing to set aside agency 
action under the Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data that 
can readily be obtained….It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable.”200 
 
The D.C. Circuit panel granted the petition, scrutinized the evidence in some detail, and 
invalidated the Commission’s conclusions on the basis of that evidence. As to the major claimed 
benefit of the proxy access rules -- that the anticipated threat from shareholder nominees would 
discipline incumbent directors and improve their performance -- the panel held that the 
Commission had failed to comply with its statutory obligation to consider the rule’s effect on 
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” and had acted arbitrarily by failing “adequately 
to assess the economic effects of a new rule.”201 But why was the Commission’s assessment 
inadequate? As we shall see, the panel offered numerous answers, but at bottom, it had two basic 
objections. One was that the agency was obligated either to provide a quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis or to explain why doing so would be infeasible.202 The other was that the evidence did 
not suffice to support the Commission’s conclusion that the rule’s benefits would materialize and 
would outweigh its costs.203 Either holding would, alone, suffice for reversal. 
                                                
196 See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
197 See Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,762 & n. 921). 
198 See Brief of Petitioners, Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10–1305), at *28-29 (summarizing 
petitioners’ arguments on appeal, but not contesting that the agency’s reliance on particular empirical 
studies was in violation of law).  
199  Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103. More generally, under State Farm, a rulemaking is arbitrary 
and capricious if, among other things, it is “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. (State Farm), 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). This implies that for questions on which experts differ, the 
agency is permitted to select any reasonable viewpoint, so long as it articulates as “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. at 43; see also Id. at 52 (“It is not infrequent that the 
available data does not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must then exercise its judgment in 
moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion.”).  
200 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009). 
201 Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
202 Id. at 1149. 
203 See Id. (rebuking the agency for “neglect[ing] to support its predictive judgments”); Id. at 1151 
(criticizing the agency’s use of “mixed evidence”).  
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[At this point, Sunstein and Vermeule have somewhat different views about the Business 
Roundable decision, and so we must present those separately. The authors agree that the decision 
was a form of libertarian administrative law and that the court overreached. But they differ about 
the authority of courts to require agencies to engage in quantified cost-benefit analysis.] 
 
 Sunstein: 
 
As a matter of policy, there are reasonable objections to the proxy access rule. The 
evidence is admittedly uncertain, and the SEC could have concluded that the rule was not, on the 
basis of that evidence, adequately justified. But there are also reasonable arguments on behalf of 
the rule. In these circumstances, the Business Roundtable case represents an excessively 
aggressive exercise of the power of judicial review, with undue second-guessing of the 
administrative record.  
 
As part of that second-guessing, the court appeared to conclude that the SEC’s obligation 
to consider the effects of a rule on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation” effectively 
required it to conduct, and make transparent, some form of quantitative cost-benefit analysis.204 
On its face, the statute does no such thing. The reason is that the agency could consider those 
effects without conducting any such analysis. At the very least, a mandate to consider the effects 
of a regulation on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation” does not, by itself, 
unambiguously require formal analysis of benefits. Indeed, it is not even clear that to show the 
requisite consideration, the agency must provide a quantitative analysis of costs.  
 
In these circumstances, the best justification for the court’s general approach might take 
the following form. Because the agency is required to consider the effects of a rule on 
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation,”205 it would be arbitrary, within the meaning of 
the APA, for the agency to proceed if those effects are both adverse and significant, at least if 
they are not justified by compensating benefits. It would follow that if a rule has net costs, or no 
net benefits, or if the SEC cannot show that a rule will have net benefits, the court should 
invalidate that rule as arbitrary. Indeed, it would generally seem arbitrary for an agency to issue a 
rule that has net costs (or no net benefits), at least unless a statute requires it to do so. To be sure, 
this argument is not self-evidently correct. Plausible questions might be raised by an effort to 
link arbitrariness review to the statutory requirement to consider the relevant effects, and thus to 
impose a requirement of cost-benefit balancing (subject of course to a feasibility constraint, 
where quantification is not possible). But as a matter of principle, that approach has some appeal, 
and it would not be beyond the pale. 
 
                                                
204 Id. at 1148-49. 
205 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f). 
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The real problem with the court’s approach lies in its fly-specking of the administrative 
record. Notably, the court appears to have invalidated the regulation on at least eight grounds: (1) 
the agency did not adequately explain its conclusion (relevant to its assessment of costs) that 
directors might not choose to oppose shareholder nominees; (2) the agency did not have adequate 
evidence to support its conclusion that the rule would improve board performance and increase 
shareholder value; (3) the agency unreasonably discounted the costs, but not the benefits, of the 
rule by reference to the traditional state law right to elect directors; (4) the agency did not 
adequately respond to comments suggesting that special interests, including unions and state and 
local governments, would use the rule to pursue self-interested objectives, rather than the 
interests of shareholders; (5) the agency did not adequately calculate the effects of the rule on the 
total number of election contests; (6) the agency did not adequately explore whether, in view of 
special statutory requirements, the rule should be applied to investment companies; (7) the 
agency did not deal adequately with the objection that the rule would impose increased costs on 
investment companies; and (8) the agency did not adequately address the concern that as applied 
to investment companies, the rule would have no net benefits. 
 
 By invoking these eight separate objections, the court offered what looks far more like a 
set of comments on a proposed rule than a standard judicial opinion. Moreover, a fair reading of 
the rule and its underlying rationale suggests that the SEC offered plausible and nonarbitrary 
(which is not necessarily to say convincing) answers to most, and to perhaps even to all, of those 
questions.  As a matter of standard arbitrariness review, the SEC’s justifications were generally 
sufficient to survive. With respect to (2), for example – and this was probably the court’s most 
important holding – the SEC made a reasonable judgment in the face of conflicting and uncertain 
evidence. (See below for details.) Where an agency has quantified what can be quantified and 
explained that some factors cannot be quantified, it has not acted arbitrarily, so long as its 
judgments have factual support and its policy choices are reasonable. As noted, there are 
plausible policy objections to the SEC's approach in the case, but with the breadth and sheer 
number of its holdings, the court exceeded its appropriate role. 
 
Vermeule: 
 
To understand the problems with the Business Roundtable opinion, a bit of legal 
background is necessary. The Commission is subject to the binding legal obligation -- created in 
1996 in the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, as a part of the Contract With 
America -- to consider the effect of its rules on “efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”206 (Following other commentators,207 we will call this the “ECCF obligation” for 
convenience). It is plausible to read this to require the agency to conduct some kind of analysis 
of how its rules affect efficiency, competition, and capital formation. But there is no reason to 
                                                
206 National Securities Markets Improvement Act, PL 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(b)). 
207 Kraus & Raso, supra note 178, at 292. 
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read into the ECCF obligation a further, distinct obligation to carry out quantified cost-benefit 
analysis, even presumptively, as long as doing so is “feasible.”  
 
The ECCF obligation is a standard type of statutory provision, one that identifies 
“relevant factors” agencies must take into account when making decisions. Were the agency to 
refuse to take those factors into account, its refusal would not only violate the direct statutory 
obligation, but would also amount to “arbitrary and capricious” agency action within the 
meaning of Section 706 of the APA.208 But the duty to consider the relevant factors, by itself, 
simply does not impose any obligation to proceed quantitatively, not even as a presumptive 
matter. It simply does not say that the Commission may only enact a new regulation if it can 
either show, with quantified cost-benefit analysis, that the benefits exceed the costs, or else 
explain why quantification is impossible. Congress knows how to require agencies to conduct 
quantified cost-benefit analysis, and has done so in a number of statutes in express terms, but not 
in the ECCF provisions.209 Were Congress to clearly and specifically require monetized cost-
benefit analysis, that command would of course prevail, but Congress has not done so in any 
general way with respect to the SEC.210 
 
Nor is there any warrant for reading a presumptive requirement of quantification -- 
provide quantified cost-benefit analysis or show it to be impossible -- directly into Section 706 of 
                                                
208 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (failure to consider 
relevant factors is arbitrary and capricious). 
209 See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)(I) (requiring agency findings on 
“quantifiable and nonquantifiable” health risks and benefits); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 
658b(c)(2) (requiring “a qualitative, and if practicable, a quantitative assessment of costs and benefits 
anticipated from the Federal mandates”); Id. at § 1532(a)(2) (requiring “qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits”); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7612 (requiring the agency 
to “consider the costs, benefits and other effects associated with compliance with each standard issued”). 
Indeed, Congress can be extremely precise in specifying different forms of cost-benefit analysis within the 
same statute. For example, the Clean Water Act specifies several forms of cost-benefit analysis. 
Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (requiring “consideration of the total cost of application of technology 
in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved”), with Id. at § 1314(b)(4)(B) (requiring 
“consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in 
effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived”) (emphasis added), with Id. at § 1314(b)(2)(B) 
(requiring consideration only of “the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,” and not requiring any cost-
benefit comparison). Thanks to Jeff Gordon for providing the first two citations. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation 11 n.13 (Colum. L. & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 464, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378562. 
210 The qualifier “in any general way” is to cover statutes like the Paperwork Reduction Act, Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, and Congressional Review Act. These require SEC to include some information relevant to 
quantified cost-benefit analysis in various filings or documents, yet none imposes a general obligation that 
SEC rulemaking should quantify costs and benefits insofar as possible. See Coates, supra note 173, at 
20-22. Nor have executive orders done so; as an “independent” agency, the SEC is exempt from the 
major cost-benefit orders. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b); see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. 
Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1201 (2000) (discussing the history of the executive’s exemption of independents from OIRA 
review). (The scare quotes around “independent” are explained in Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of 
Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013); Note, The SEC Is Not an Independent Agency, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 781 (2013)). 
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the APA, under the rubric of arbitrary and capricious review. There are two independent 
problems with such an approach. The first is that it is inconsistent with congressional 
instructions, rightly understood.211 Suppose that the agency’s organic statutes require 
consideration of economic factors, but do not require the agency to quantify its consideration of 
costs and benefits (even presumptively), while other statutes do contain such a requirement. 
Then it would render Congress’ careful calibration of requirements pointless were judges to read 
the open-ended language of Section 706 to impose a global mandate of quantification or even 
presumptive quantification. Arbitrariness review is not a license to impose indirectly a set of 
procedural requirements, like (presumptive) quantification, that Congress refused to impose 
directly.  
 
The second problem is that a presumptive requirement of quantification is inconsistent 
with Section 706 itself, and with the approach to judicial review and the judicial role that the 
APA embodies and presupposes. Arbitrariness review does not permit judges to require agencies 
to use whatever decision-procedure the judges happen to think is best, declaring all other 
decision-procedures “irrational.” Rather it leaves space for any decision-procedure that can be 
defended among reasonable professionals, and strictly qualitative cost-benefit analysis surely 
passes that threshold, given its ubiquity both in policymaking and in life. It is demonstrable that 
reasonable disagreement flourishes -- both among experts and the interested public generally -- 
about the superiority of quantified cost-benefit analysis to other decision-procedures; even 
mainstream proponents of quantified cost-benefit do not usually say that no rational mind could 
disagree with their views.212 If that requirement could be imposed under the rubric of 706, then 
so could the opposite. Judges of a different cast of mind could require agencies to use feasibility 
analysis instead,213 perhaps declaring it “arbitrary” and “irrational” to use quantified cost-benefit 
analysis when values are so obviously incommensurable.214 
 
At bottom, quantified cost-benefit analysis is just one decision-procedure among others. 
But Vermont Yankee holds that judges have no authority to require agencies to impose more or 
                                                
211 There is an open question here whether Chevron deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of its 
organic statute with respect to these issues. After the Court’s recent decision in City of Arlington v. FCC, 
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), the answer should be that Chevron deference does apply. We bracket that issue 
for purposes of the current discussion, however. In our view, the ECCF obligation, even read de novo and 
without deference to the agency, does not plausibly impose a presumptive requirement of quantification. 
212 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 167 
(1999) (“Many law professors, economists, and philosophers believe that CBA does not produce morally 
relevant information and should not be used in project evaluation. A few commentators argue that the 
information produced by CBA has some, but limited, relevance.”); see also Id. at 170-72 & n.10-18 
(discussing the history of cost-benefit analysis and collecting works); 
213 Feasibility studies have been used by many agencies. See, e.g., US DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE RURAL 
BUSINESS-COOPERATIVE SERVICE, VITAL STEPS: A COOPERATIVE FEASIBILITY STUDY GUIDE (2010), available 
at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/sr58.pdf; EPA & US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, A GUIDE TO 
DEVELOPING AND DOCUMENTING COST ESTIMATES DURING THE FEASIBILITY STUDY (July 2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/remedy/pdfs/finaldoc.pdf.  
214 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
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different procedures than Congress itself imposed;215 and the ECCF obligation is, 
straightforwardly, a mere obligation to consider certain factors. Nor may arbitrariness review be 
used as a way to smuggle a controversial decision procedure in through the back door and foist it 
upon agencies. In a 1983 successor case to Vermont Yankee, a case named Baltimore Gas & 
Electric,216 the Supreme Court rebuked the D.C. Circuit again, also in the nuclear power setting, 
for a similar maneuver. We will return to that part of the story shortly. For now, what matters is 
that Business Roundtable ignored all of these distinctions and problems, and briskly subjected 
the Commission to the presumptive requirement we have mentioned, demanding quantified cost-
benefit analysis or a showing that quantification would be impossible.217  
 
Return to both authors: 
 
Bracketing the question just discussed, there is another problem: the panel also erred by 
erecting a legally unfounded burden of proof. The panel had stated in general terms that “the 
Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed 
adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; 
neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to 
substantial problems raised by commenters.”218 But the Commission’s detailed discussion of the 
peer-reviewed scholarship, its methodological cautions, and its explanation that the relevant rules 
involved unquantifiable benefits,219 did provide a legally adequate explanation of the limits of 
feasible analysis. In the face of the record, the panel had to fall back upon impeaching the 
Commission’s substantive view of the evidence: 
 
The Commission instead relied exclusively and heavily upon two relatively unpersuasive 
studies….In view of the admittedly (and at best) "mixed" empirical evidence, we think 
the Commission has not sufficiently supported its conclusion that increasing the potential 
for election of directors nominated by shareholders will result in improved board and 
company performance and shareholder value.220 
 
It is not a valid move in American administrative law for judges to decide that peer-reviewed 
economic studies supporting the agency’s view strike them as “unpersuasive,” or for judges to 
bar agencies from proceeding in the face of “mixed evidence.” The panel’s discussion is not 
without ambiguity, but it seems to imply that the antonym of “mixed” evidence is “clear” 
evidence, so that the Commission would have to give “clear” evidence in support of its views. 
Analytically, this collapses two distinct administrative-law questions: (1) the standard of proof 
under which the agency must demonstrate its conclusions (to its own satisfaction), and (2) the 
                                                
215 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. 
216 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
217 647 F.3d at 1149. 
218 Id. at 1148-49. 
219 See generally 75 Fed. Reg. 56753 et seq. (discussing the agency’s detailed cost-benefit analysis). 
220 Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (internal citations omitted). 
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standard of review under which judges examine the adequacy of the agency’s conclusions.221 
Even if “mixed” evidence would not suffice for the former, it may well survive the latter, just as 
a dubious jury verdict may not be so clearly invalid as to survive the permissive standard for 
judicial review.  
 
In any event, there is no conceivably valid legal ground for saying that agencies 
generally, or the Commission in particular, may not regulate because the evidence supporting the 
benefits of regulation is “mixed.” Where predictions are required, evidence is often mixed, and a 
decision to proceed is not arbitrary for that reason. Ideally, of course, an agency would know 
both probabilities and expected outcomes. To speak in stylized fashion, it might believe that a 
regulation is 80 percent likely to produce $500 million in benefits, and 20 percent likely to 
produce $0 in expected benefits; or 50 percent likely to produce $400 million in benefits, and 50 
percent likely to produce $0 in benefits; or 20 percent likely to produce $500 million in benefits, 
and 80 percent likely to produce $0 in benefits – with expected values, in such cases, of $400 
million, $200 million, and $100 million respectively. In all such cases, a judgment in favor of 
regulation would be acceptable (unless the agency were also required to balance costs, and even 
then, only if the costs exceeded the benefits). In actual practice, precise assignments are usually 
not possible, and as a matter of law, a reasoned agency decision in favor of one view, in the face 
of conflicting evidence, is acceptable.  
 
It is true that an agency might well be deemed arbitrary if it proceeded with a small 
probability of producing any benefits at all. But there is no constraint on proceeding in the face 
of “mixed” evidence, either in the statutory ECCF obligation to consider certain economic 
factors, in the APA burden of proof, or in the APA scheme of reasoned decisionmaking and 
judicial review for arbitrariness. It is hardly arbitrary for an agency to decide, in the face of 
uncertainty, that it favors regulation over non-regulation.222 Although the presence of uncertainty 
may make such a decision irreducibly arbitrary in a decision-theoretic sense, it is not arbitrary 
and capricious in a legal sense.223  
 
Administrative law has been here before. In the last case of a systematically disfavored 
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit shifted its ground after Vermont 
Yankee. Abandoning the “hybrid proceduralism” that the Supreme Court had so severely 
rebuked, the lower court bent its efforts to stringent arbitrariness review of NRC decisions, a 
                                                
221 See Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. California, 
508 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1993) (“[A standard of review is] customarily used to describe, not a degree of 
certainty that some fact has been proven in the first instance, but a degree of certainty that a factfinder in 
the first instance made a mistake in concluding that a fact had been proven under the applicable standard 
of proof.”). 
222 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52 (“It is not infrequent that the available data does not settle a regulatory 
issue and the agency must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the 
record to a policy conclusion.”). 
223 See Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law), J. LEGAL STUD. 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_Id=2239155. 
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course that the Vermont Yankee opinion had left open, perhaps incautiously. Five years later, in 
1983, the Court had to step in again to restrain the lower court’s interference. In Baltimore Gas 
& Electric v. NRDC, the issue was whether the NRC could make a “zero-release” assumption 
about spent nuclear fuel in long-term storage224 -- in other words, whether the agency could 
make an optimistic assumption about the effects of nuclear waste policy under irreducible 
uncertainty, just as the SEC did with respect to the proxy-access rule. The D.C. Circuit had 
denounced the agency for arbitrariness, on the ground that its zero-release assumption was 
unsupported.225 But the Supreme Court was emphatic that when agencies act at the frontiers of 
knowledge, courts should be extraordinarily reluctant to intervene. “A reviewing court,” it said, 
“must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, 
at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to 
simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”226  
 
Baltimore Gas & Electric involved natural science, whereas predicting the effects of the 
proxy-access rule involved economics and social sciences, but this is not a relevant difference, 
and otherwise the cases are on all fours. An agency acted at the frontiers of the known and the 
knowable, and the D.C. Circuit -- in a progressive cause in the one case, a libertarian cause in the 
other -- demanded that the agency supply evidence that it reasonably claimed that it did not have. 
Administrative law no more tolerates that stance today than it did before. 
 
Most recently, in Investment Company Institute v. CFTC,227 a panel of the Circuit upheld 
against arbitrariness challenge a new CFTC rule regarding derivatives trading. The new rule,228 
enacted under the authority of and in the spirit of Dodd-Frank, narrowed the exclusions from the 
CFTC’s regulatory scheme for derivatives trading, bringing “registered investment companies” 
(mutual funds and others) within the regulatory ambit.229 The regulated entities would then be 
subject to data-disclosure obligations and other regulatory programs.230 Citing Business 
Roundtable and its predecessors, the regulated entities complained (as relevant here) that the 
agency had failed to adequately consider the costs and benefits of the rule.231 The CFTC’s 
organic statute required it to consider the “costs and benefits” of its actions and to “evaluate[]” 
those costs and benefits in light of, among other factors, “considerations of the efficiency, 
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets.”232 
 
                                                
224 462 U.S. at 91-92. 
225 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 478-85 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), rev’d sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Electric, 426 U.S. 87. 
226 Baltimore Gas & Electric, 462 U.S. at 103. 
227 Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 720 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
228 Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Compliance Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 
11,252 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
229 See Investment Company Institute, 720 F.3d at 372-75. 
230 See Id. 
231 Id. at 377. 
232 Id. at 377 (quoting 7 U.S.C.A. § 19(a)). 
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As in Business Roundtable, a crucial issue involved the nonquantifiable benefits of the 
regulation. The problem arises in the financial domain when both the regulated behavior and the 
regulatory responses have a speculative character. When agencies act to prevent a large-scale 
crisis, and no crisis occurs in some period of reference, was the regulation helpful or useless? 
And what if anything was the marginal contribution of the particular regulations at issue? These 
questions could easily be raised with a raised eyebrow and in a pointed way, so as to suggest that 
the agency had behaved arbitrarily. The issues are likely to have a degree of uncertainty, as the 
Investment Company Institute panel recognized -- in words that could have been written in 
Business Roundtable as well: 
 
The appellants further complain that CFTC failed to put a precise number on the benefit 
of data collection in preventing future financial crises. But the law does not require 
agencies to measure the immeasurable. CFTC's discussion of unquantifiable benefits 
fulfills its statutory obligation to consider and evaluate potential costs and benefits. See 
Fox, 556 U.S. at 519, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (holding that agencies are not required to "adduce 
empirical data that" cannot be obtained). Where Congress has required "rigorous, 
quantitative economic analysis," it has made that requirement clear in the agency's 
statute, but it imposed no such requirement here. American Financial Services Ass'n v. 
FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 986 (D.C.Cir.1985); cf., e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (requiring the 
agency to "prepare a written statement containing ... a qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits" that includes, among other things, 
"estimates by the agency of the [rule's] effect on the national economy").233 
 
All this is exactly correct under current law. The hard question is what its significance 
might be. It is simply unclear, too soon to tell, whether Investment Company Institute portends a 
broader retrenchment in the Circuit, or instead a mere tacking backwards, an instance of reculer 
pour mieux sauter. Investment Company Institute relies, in part, on a putative distinction of 
Business Roundtable,234 but we find that distinction less than convincing, and the two cases are 
inconsistent at a deeper level; Investment Company Institute displays a tolerance of regulation 
                                                
233 Id. at 379. On the general issue of nonquantifiable benefits, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of 
Quantification, Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014). 
234 The putative distinction is that in Business Roundtable, the SEC had failed to explain why its new rule 
was necessary, in light of extant regulation. See Investment Company Institute, 720 F.3d at 378; see also 
Gordon, supra note 209. This is unconvincing because it is a post hoc redescription of the rationale of 
Business Roundtable, in which the central point was not regulatory overlap with extant rules, but was 
instead the SEC’s failure either to quantify fully the benefits of its regulation (which was impossible) or to 
explain why the benefits could not be quantified (which the SEC had actually done, as explained earlier). 
See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148-49, 1149-51; see also Id. at 1154 (holding that because the 
rule was arbitrary and capricious on its face due to the improper cost-benefit analysis, the rule was 
“assuredly invalid as applied specifically to investment companies,” but then going on to discuss that the 
rule as applied to investment companies would also be invalid because the SEC failed to explain why the 
rule was necessary in light of the extant regulation). 
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under conditions of uncertainty that is entirely foreign to its predecessor. It displays a different 
“mood.”235 
  
But we should not make too much of what is, after all, merely one data point.236 A 
striking feature of the progressive administrative law of the D.C. Circuit before Vermont Yankee 
was that it displayed exactly this quality of tacking, of advances followed by partial 
retrenchments, of alternative holdings and ambiguous doctrine. Cynics might see such a pattern 
as a deliberate strategy, on the part of the lower court, to present the smallest possible target for 
reversal by the Supreme Court – as we have noted, a suggestion offered by then-Professor Scalia 
about the D.C. Circuit’s ambiguous caselaw before Vermont Yankee.237 (Scalia acutely observed 
that “these same devices that inhibit Supreme Court review facilitate the development of 
inconsistency among the various panels of the D.C. Circuit itself.”238) But we favor a different 
explanation, which is structural rather than strategic: It is in the nature of multimember courts 
that no course of action will be followed with iron consistency,239 because of the vagaries of 
voting, the aggregation of voting, and the presentation of cases. Whichever explanation one 
prefers, it is premature to decide that the judges who power libertarian administrative law have 
changed course. 
 
 
E. Standing 
 
                                                
235 Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.) (suggesting that 
with the enactment of the “substantial evidence” test, Congress had expressed a “mood”). 
236 Another recent data point is Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., No. 13-5252, 2014 WL 1408274, -- F.3d -- 
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 2014), the “conflict minerals” decision that invalidated a congressionally-mandated 
SEC disclosure regulation on commercial speech grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 129-140. 
Before reaching the commercial speech issue, the panel – Judge Sentelle writing for himself and Judge 
Randolph, with a partial concurrence by Judge Srinivasan -- upheld the SEC rule against arbitrariness 
attack. Id. at *3-8. The opinion cited Investment Company Institute for the proposition that “[a]n agency is 
not required ‘to measure the immeasurable,’ and need not conduct a ‘rigorous, quantitative economic 
analysis’ unless the statute explicitly directs it to do so.” Id. at *8. On several grounds, however, it is 
unclear whether this portends a retrenchment. First, the panel did after all invalidate the regulation on 
constitutional grounds, Id. at *8-11, so the decision may only portend that libertarian administrative law is 
moving into an even more aggressive phase, in which the label “free speech” is used as a substitute for 
stringent arbitrariness review and for substantive due process protection of property rights and economic 
interests. Second, it would be open to a future panel to distinguish the Conflict Minerals Case as a case in 
which the underlying regulation was itself explicitly mandated by Congress, in Dodd-Frank. See Id. at *1 
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p), 78m note (‘Conflict Minerals’)). Indeed Congress itself had already found that 
the benefits of the regulation -- unquantifiable benefits -- justified the costs. See Id. at *8.. In such a case, 
arbitrariness review might itself be relaxed or even suspended. (Bracketing questions of constitutional 
arbitrariness review under due process, such review is extremely deferential as to administrative 
rulemaking. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935)). 
237 Scalia, supra note 2, at 372 (“The pattern of dicta, alternate holdings, and confused holdings out of 
which the D.C. Circuit's principle of APA hybrid rulemaking so clearly and authoritatively emerged had the 
effect, if not the purpose, of assuring compliance below while avoiding accountability above.”). 
238 Id. at 373 n.128. 
239 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 813-831 (1982). 
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For many decades, the law of standing was built largely on private law foundations.240 
The central idea was that if government agencies intruded on common law rights, those who 
were subject to that intrusion would have access to the courts, above all in order to require a 
showing of legislative authorization.241 In two respects, the private law model had distinctive 
libertarian features. First, it protected private rights against government intrusion. Second, it did 
not allow people to have access to court if they did not have such rights and if they sought to 
promote or to increase government regulation. Under the private law model, for example, 
consumers and environmental groups would have a great deal of difficulty in qualifying for 
standing. 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act allows standing for private rightholders, but it does 
not embrace the private law model; it grants standing to all those who suffer “legal wrong” 
because of agency action, or who are “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute.”242 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court interpreted these 
provisions expansively, allowing all those with “injury in fact” to have access to court, so long as 
they were also “arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated” by the underlying 
statute.243 It was clear that the Court meant to broaden, by a large margin, the class of persons 
and organizations that would be entitled to have access to court, and that those complaining of 
insufficient regulatory activity would often be entitled to have their say.244 
 
In the decades since that time, it is an understatement to say that the Court’s decisions 
have not followed a clear path.245 Nor can it be said that a clear path emerges from the decisions 
of the DC Circuit. But a number of rulings by that court have moved toward reasserting the 
private law foundations of standing doctrine. In the relevant cases, the court has invoked the 
injury-in-fact test to deny standing to environmental, labor, and consumer organizations 
complaining of what they see as insufficient regulation. The resulting pattern is very far from 
unbroken, but in some important cases, it has an unmistakably libertarian character. 
 
Here is a stylized description of that pattern. If regulated entities complain of agency 
action, and seek to fend it off, they are generally entitled to bring suit. All of the core Article III 
requirements are met. They are readily found to show an injury in fact that is likely to be 
redressed by a decree in their favor. At the same time, the other requirements for standing are 
                                                
240 For a general account, see Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1432 (1988). 
241 See Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1924). 
242 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
243 See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-58 (1970). 
244 See Id. at 154 (“Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people 
who may protest administrative action.”). 
245 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11 (1998); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (U.S.S.C. 
2000); see also Charles A. Wright & Mary Kay Kane, § 14 “Case or Controversy”—Standing to Litigate, 
20 FED. PRAC. & PROC. DESKBOOK § 14 (Apr. 2013). 
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met as well. Regulated entities can generally show that they are “arguably within the zone of 
interests” protected or regulated by the underlying statute, and also that their interests are not 
widely generalized.  
 
By contrast, public interest groups sometimes have had a difficult time meeting the 
relevant requirements. To some extent, this asymmetry is unobjectionable, because it is built into 
existing doctrine. If a group called Environmental Defenders, with no members in Utah, 
complains of a development project in Utah, there is no injury in fact, and hence no standing.246  
But the D.C. Circuit has gone well beyond the Supreme Court’s instructions. It has erected 
barriers where existing law is ambiguous or arguably cuts the other way. 
 
In a large number of cases, the court has permitted expansive standing to regulated 
entities who sought to challenge federal regulations, even when those challenges were not clearly 
authorized under existing standing doctrine. For example, it is hardly obvious that private 
investors have standing to challenge system-level decisions by financial regulators, at least 
where the effects of those decisions on particular investors are necessary speculative. 
Nonetheless, the DC Circuit had no difficulty in granting standing.247  Or consider the question 
whether a competitor may challenge an agency decision that might impose economic harm. 
While the Supreme Court has generally been willing to grant standing in such cases,248 we can 
readily imagine situations in which the harm might be considered impossibly speculative, and in 
which it might be objected that competitors are not even arguably within the zone of interests. 
Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit has been conspicuously open to such challenges, especially when 
the defendant is the Environmental Protection Agency. Cases in which the court has granted 
standing to regulated entities are plentiful, and so far as we have been able to ascertain, the 
pattern is nearly unbroken.249 
  
By contrast, public interest groups have a mixed record. In many cases, public interest 
groups have been denied standing even when their members made a plausible claim of injury-in-
                                                
246 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
247 Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that private investor 
has standing to challenge Office of Thrift Supervision’s decision, since economic harm was “substantially 
probable”); 
248 See, e.g., Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). 
249 Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. E.P.A., 705 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that regulated entity had 
standing to challenge EPA’s approval of competitors’ allowance transfers); Holistic Candlers & 
Consumers Ass'n v. Food & Drug Admin., 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that regulated 
entities have standing to challenge FDA actions that would allegedly outlaw manufacture of their 
products); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. E.P.A., 652 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that trade associations 
have standing to challenge EPA permit system); Lichoulas v. F.E.R.C., 606 F.3d 769, 774 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (holding that regulated entity has standing to challenge FERC’s termination of license to operate a 
hydropower project); Affum v. United States, 566 F.3d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that regulated entity 
had standing to challenge decision of Food and Nutrition Service); Alvin Lou Media, Inc. v. F.C.C., 571 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that radio-station applicant for license had standing to challenge FCC’s 
denial of reconsideration of application); Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 579 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding 
that regulated cable companies had standing to challenge FCC rule). 
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fact. In Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki,250 for example, the court held that a veterans 
advocacy group lacked standing to challenge Department of Veterans Affairs delays in 
processing claims for disability benefits. The central conclusion was that a delay in the average 
time of review could not be counted as an individual injury -- a conclusion that is not directly in 
conflict with Supreme Court precedent, but that is in some tension with prominent rulings.251  In 
Commuter Rail Div. of Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,252 the court held that Sierra 
Club lacked standing to challenge the Surface Transportation Board’s approval of a merger of 
railroad companies, notwithstanding a plausible argument that the merger would have harmful 
environmental consequences. The court found a lack of causation and redressability. In Ass'n of 
Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.,253 the court held that flight-
attendant union lacked standing to challenge Department of Transportation’s decision to certify 
Virgin Airlines, finding an absence of causation between that decision and adverse effects on 
union members. In Young Am.'s Found. v. Gates,254 the court ruled that an advocacy group 
lacked standing to change Department of Defense’s grants to state universities that deny access 
to military recruiters, concluding that the injury was too speculative. In Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Perciasepe,255 the court held that an environmental advocacy group lacked standing to challenge 
EPA’s delays in promulgating revisions to guidelines under Clean Water Act, because it provides 
“no more than speculation to support its argument.” And in Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post 
Properties,256 Inc., the court concluded that a fair-housing advocacy group lacked standing to sue 
for violations of Fair Housing Act, because the facts were insufficient to established “concrete 
and particularized” or “actual or imminent” injury. 
 
We do not contend that these decisions are implausible, or that a majority of the Supreme 
Court would disagree with all or most of them; the Court’s decisions leave significant 
ambiguities and gaps. But it is reasonable to say that almost all of them could have gone the 
other way. It is well known that whether an injury is “speculative” depends on how it is 
characterized. If an injury is characterized as an opportunity or a risk, it may well count for 
purposes of standing even if it would seem implausibly speculative if characterized more 
narrowly.257 And in principle, the requirements of causation and redressability are double-edged 
swords. They might well be used to prevent regulated entities from having access to court, on the 
                                                
250 599 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
251 See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Cetacean Society, 478 US 221 (1986). 
252 608 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
253 564 F.3d 462 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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255 714 F.3d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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257 Compare, e.g., Ne. Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (holding that plaintiff “seeking to challenge [a municipal preferential 
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with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (holding that plaintiffs lacks standing because they failed to 
allege an “injury suffered as a direct result of having personally been denied equal treatment”).  
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ground that it is purely speculative whether a judicial ruling -- for example, requiring compliance 
with some procedural requirement -- will actually redress the alleged injury. But we have been 
unable to find even a single case in which the court of appeals has used standing doctrine in that 
way. With respect to standing, administrative law has a clear libertarian dimension in a number 
of important rulings by the D.C. Circuit. 
 
F. Reviewability  
 
1. When Does “Shall” Mean “Must”? 
 
Even if parties have standing, the APA withholds judicial review when statutes preclude 
review, or where agency action is “committed to agency discretion by law.”258 These provisions 
are not self-interpreting, and the Supreme Court has developed an elaborate body of precedent.259 
The law of reviewability in the D.C. Circuit, however, relates uneasily to that body of precedent, 
in part because the Circuit’s reviewability decisions sometimes display a distinct libertarian 
valence. We will examine one particularly telling pair of cases in detail.  
 
It is common ground that in a hierarchical judicial system, lower courts should follow the 
decisions of higher courts in legally identical cases. The D.C. Circuit has come very close to 
simply declining to follow controlling Supreme Court precedent on reviewability, in a case from 
2013, Cook v. FDA.260 The case is important not so much for itself, but as evidence of the 
willingness of some of the Circuit’s most influential judges more or less to ignore the 
instructions of the Supreme Court by means of irrelevant distinctions. And the libertarian valence 
of that willingness emerges when we compare Cook with another, strikingly similar case, Sierra 
Club v. Jackson,261 from 2011. 
 
 Cook involved the reviewability of agency non-enforcement decisions.262 In 1985, in 
Heckler v. Chaney,263 the Court had held such decisions presumptively unreviewable.264 Chaney 
arose out of an attempt, by opponents of capital punishment, to obtain judicial review of the 
FDA’s refusal to begin enforcement proceedings to prevent states from using lethal drugs as a 
method of execution.265 The plaintiffs claimed that use of the drugs in capital punishment 
violated the federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act.266 
 
                                                
258 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
259 See generally CHARLES H. KOCH & RICHARD MURPHY, 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 12:10-14 (3d ed.). 
260 733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
261 648 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
262 733 F.3d at 3. 
263 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
264 Id. at 831. 
265 Id. at 823. 
266 Id. 
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The Chaney Court held that agency decisions to enforce, or not, are presumptively 
“committed to agency discretion by law”267 within the meaning of §701 of the APA, and thus 
unreviewable. Although the Court said that the presumption could be overcome by a sufficiently 
clear statutory command to enforce in a particular class of cases,268 it found no such command in 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.269 Despite the seemingly mandatory terms of the Act, the 
Court was very clear about a point that the D.C. Circuit later disregarded: mandatory text need 
not always be taken at face value in this setting.270 Rather, even facially mandatory commands 
take on a special legal meaning when read in light of the need to allocate enforcement resources 
among the myriad of tasks that agencies face, and in light of the robust quasi-constitutional 
tradition of executive discretion over enforcement decisions.271 
 
Cook presented strikingly similar facts. The main difference was that the case involved 
foreign commerce rather than domestic commerce; the plaintiffs were challenging the FDA’s 
decision not to initiate enforcement action against lethal drugs imported from abroad.272 That 
distinction is not legally relevant to the reviewability issue, and the obvious resolution would be 
to apply Chaney and have done with it. The panel -- Judges D.H. Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Rogers 
-- nonetheless allowed judicial review.273  
 
The relevant provisions stated that FDA “shall request” samples of drugs produced at 
unregistered foreign facilities, and then, “‘[i]f it appears’ that an article offered for import 
violates a substantive prohibition of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act], ... ‘such article shall be 
refused admission.’”274 A critical provision in Chaney, however, had also used “shall,” yet the 
Court had held that language insufficient to override the agency’s enforcement discretion.275 The 
Court was “unwilling to attribute such a sweeping meaning”276 to this language, despite its 
facially mandatory terms. So it was not obvious, at best, how Cook and Chaney could be 
distinguished. 
 
Judge Ginsburg, writing for the panel in Cook, tried the following tack:  
 
The plaintiffs begin by arguing simply that “the ordinary meaning of ‘shall’ is ‘must.’ ” 
The case law provides ample support…. Citing Chaney, the FDA objects that ‘in the 
enforcement context ... [the word ‘shall’] may not be properly read to curtail the agency's 
                                                
267 Id. at 831. 
268 Id. at 832-34 (distinguishing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)). 
269 Id. at 835-37. 
270 See Id. at 835 (construing statutory requirement that violators “shall be imprisoned ... or fined” as a 
permissive grant of authority to the agency, not a mandatory requirement to prosecute). 
271 See Id. at 831-32. 
272 See Cook, 733 F.3d at 4 (the drugs in question were imported from the UK). 
273 Id. at 10. 
274 Id. at 3 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 381(a)). 
275 470 U.S. at 835. 
276 Id.  
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discretion.’ In Chaney, however, the word ‘shall’ appeared in the consequent of a section 
providing for criminal sanctions: A violator ‘shall be imprisoned ... or fined.’ 470 U.S. at 
835, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 333). The criminal statute in Chaney did not 
use “shall” in connection with the antecedent condition of prosecution…. The 
‘enforcement’ discretion held unreviewable in Chaney, therefore, was whether to 
recommend prosecution [to the Attorney General]. Here, by contrast, the word "shall" 
appears in both an antecedent (“shall request ...samples”) and the consequent ("shall be 
refused admission").277 
 
In the abstract, the distinction makes sense, but it is unconvincing in the context at hand. The 
panel writes as though the antecedent of “shall be refused admission” is “shall request samples.” 
It is not. (Actually, the panel writes “an antecedent,”278 a misleading formulation made necessary 
by the unfortunate fact that the request procedure comes well before the sanction of refusing 
admission, in the statutory sequence.) What the provision does say is that “if it appears that from 
the examination of such samples or otherwise that ... such article is adulterated, misbranded, or 
[an unapproved new drug] ..., then such article shall be refused admission.”279 FDA argued 
straightforwardly that the antecedent in this provision, phrased in conditional rather than 
mandatory terms, allowed FDA conventional regulatory discretion to decide whether the 
statutory criteria were met, and thus whether to trigger the sanctions in the consequent.280  
 
Nothing in Chaney suggests that the agency’s discretion would be displaced by such a 
provision. There is also an undeveloped implication in Judge Ginsburg’s discussion that 
enforcement discretion is less subject to statutory override where criminal sanctions rather than 
merely (civil) regulatory sanctions are at issue.281 But the implication is left undeveloped because 
it would be extremely dubious, or even indefensible, as a general proposition. Certainly Chaney 
drew no such distinction; it lumped together regulatory and criminal sanctions under the rubric of 
“enforcement actions”282 and held that the agency enjoyed unreviewable discretion over all of 
these. 
 
But bracket all of these issues. The larger point of Chaney, which the panel ignored, is 
that in the context of statutory sanctions, whatever their nature, a congressional specification that 
the sanction “shall be X” is simply not enough to obligate the relevant enforcer to impose the 
sanctions (or to recommend that another agency impose the sanctions) at every possible 
                                                
277 Cook, 733 F.3d at 7-8 (emphasis added). 
278 Id. at 8. 
279 21 U.S.C. § 831(a) (emphasis added). 
280 See Cook, 733 F.3d at 8-9. 
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most of which were regulatory rather than criminal). 
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opportunity. The Chaney Court held that to override the executive’s retained enforcement 
discretion, Congress must do more than merely specify sanctions; it must clearly and specifically 
remove the agency’s retained discretion over the determination whether to trigger the sanctions, 
and there is no such clear statement in Cook.283 There is a hint, in the Cook discussion, that the 
panel meant to distinguish discretion over whether to enforce from the mode of enforcement.284 
But the Chaney Court said expressly that despite the mandatory language, the FDA’s discretion 
extended to both the question whether to enforce and the question how to enforce.285 In effect, 
the Cook panel refused to acknowledge that in an enforcement context, according to the Court in 
Chaney, it is just not true that “shall” ordinarily means “must.”286 Whatever the literal meaning 
of “shall,” its legal meaning, in a complex regulatory scheme, is affected by the institutional 
context. 
 
The troubling thing is not so much the decision itself, which rests on somewhat peculiar 
facts unlikely to be frequently at issue. The troubling thing is the court’s attitude towards 
controlling precedent from a hierarchical superior, squarely on point. The panel appears to see 
that precedent as something to be brushed aside with a misleading distinction rather than a 
binding command to be internalized and obeyed. And the attitude of casual disregard that 
underpins Cook is not neutral. In its substantive aspect, the decision is classically libertarian; 
opposition to the death penalty is a cause upon which many libertarians of left and right 
converge.287 (Here there is a clear split between law-and-order conservatives, on the one hand, 
and conservative libertarians on the other. Edward Crane, founder of the Cato Institute, professes 
the following view on capital punishment: “it is morally justified but … the government is often 
so inept and corrupt that innocent people might die as a result. Thus, I personally oppose capital 
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punishment.”288) In that sense, Cook has a particular, libertarian valence. But the possible 
valences of reviewability law only become fully apparent when we bring in another case. 
 
 2. When “Shall” Does Mean “May,” After All? 
 
 Now imagine a case involving precisely the same legal issue: whether mandatory 
statutory language, stating that the agency “shall” take enforcement action, suffices to overcome 
the Chaney presumption against unreviewability of agency decisions not to enforce. Suppose 
also, however, that the relevant agency refusal to enforce involved an agency declining to 
enforce environmental laws against a regulated industrial entity, so that the libertarian instinct 
would now pull in favor of the Chaney presumption and against reviewability. A consistently 
textualist judge would decide the two cases consistently, all else equal, depending upon the 
details of the statutory scheme. But a consistently libertarian judge would be inclined to treat the 
two cases differently, finding that the presumption of unreviewability was not overcome in the 
case of environmental enforcement, even though it had been in Cook. 
 
 Et voila: Sierra Club v. Jackson,289 decided in 2011. The panel -- Judges Brown, 
Ginsburg and Sentelle, three of the main proponents of libertarian administrative law -- held that 
the Sierra Club could not obtain judicial review290 of the EPA Administrator’s refusal to initiate 
action to prevent the construction of three major pollution-emitting facilities in a Clean Air Act 
attainment area.291 In such areas, the statute creates a permitting scheme in order to prevent 
significant deterioration of air quality.292 The critical statutory provision, titled “Enforcement,” 
states as follows: 
 
“[t]he Administrator shall, and a State may, take such measures, including issuance of an 
order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to prevent the construction or 
modification of a major emitting facility … proposed to be constructed” in an attainment 
area.293 
 
The underlined language cuts more strongly in favor of overcoming the presumption of 
unreviewability than does the language in Cook. The quoted provision not only says that the 
agency “shall” enforce, but also says, in pointed contrast, that states “may” enforce, suggesting 
by negative implication that the former was deliberately chosen to be a mandatory command. 
And the provision, read in the ordinary way, extends the range of possible “measures” only to 
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encompass those measures necessary to prevent construction of the major emitting facility. It 
gives the Administrator no discretion over whether to take steps to prevent construction in the 
first place; the obvious point is that the Administrator must do so. 
 
 The panel, however, held that the presumption of unreviewability was not overcome, 
allowing the major polluting facilities to be built unchallenged. Decisive here, the panel said, 
was the larger “context and structure” of the statute: 
 
Congress's mandate to the Administrator is that she shall "take such measures, including 
issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary...." There is no guidance to 
the Administrator or to a reviewing court as to what action is "necessary." Granted, the 
statute further says, "as necessary to prevent the construction or modification of a major 
emitting facility ... proposed to be constructed" in an attainment area, but that nonetheless 
leaves it to the Administrator's discretion to determine what action is "necessary." [Here, 
the Administrator] has apparently made the decision that no action is necessary.294 
 
The literalistic textualism of Cook, in which the panel insists that “shall” means “shall,” here 
finds its Carroll-esque counterpoint: a statute commanding that the agency “shall” take action as 
“necessary to prevent the construction of” a major polluting facility apparently allows the agency 
to opt for no action at all. 
 
Sierra Club v. Jackson and Cook may be consistent from a libertarian standpoint, but they 
are legally irreconcilable. This is not to say which decision is correct, which incorrect. It is even 
possible that both are wrong. More plausible than the actual panel outcomes would have been the 
opposite pair of holdings: that the presumption of unreviewability was overcome in Sierra Club 
v. Jackson, but not overcome in Cook. Whatever the legal merits, however, the larger point is 
clear. Recent reviewability cases, decided by judges in the core libertarian cadre on the Circuit,  
have an unmistakable libertarian valence.295 
 
III. Overview 
 
A. Libertarianism, Progressivism, and Administrative Law 
 
As it now stands, there is a sense in which administrative law does have libertarian 
features, certainly insofar as it enables regulated entities to challenge the legality of agency 
action. If an agency has invaded the private sphere, those who have been injured are allowed to 
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test the question of legality. But under appropriate circumstances, parties may also challenge 
agency refusal to regulate others,296 or challenge agency decisions to deregulate.297 Review of 
agency action for conformity to organic statutes, for procedural regularity, and for arbitrariness 
or substantial evidence is available, and occurs in the same fashion, in all these different 
contexts.298 And it is clear that when agency action is authorized by law, and consistent with 
procedural requirements, it must be upheld even if it runs afoul of libertarian strictures (at least if 
there is no constitutional objection). 
 
The consequence is that the APA, and surrounding doctrines, cannot be counted as 
libertarian in any general or systematic way. To be sure, we could imagine a statute that would 
squarely fall in the libertarian camp, perhaps protecting property rights by requiring 
compensation for certain types of regulatory action, perhaps by imposing novel burdens of 
justification for intrusions on private rights. But the APA is not that statute, and the Supreme 
Court has not read it as if it were. It is true that some doctrines at the intersection of 
constitutional law and administrative law -- including the commercial speech doctrine - have a 
distinctive libertarian flavor. But there is a significant difference between the commercial speech 
doctrine as it now stands and the commercial speech doctrine as the D.C. Circuit has started to 
understand it. It is also true that the Supreme Court has sometimes deployed arbitrariness review 
in a fairly aggressive way,299 and no one would be shocked if it did so in the future. But as the 
law now stands, arbitrariness review, as undertaken by the Court, does not have any kind of 
libertarian tilt.300  
 
Nor is administrative law generally and systematically progressive, or pro-regulatory, or 
anything else -- though here as well, we could imagine a statute, or a set of implementing 
doctrines, that tilted in that direction. As the Supreme Court understands it, administrative law, 
as law, has no systematic and general valence that can be explained in the terms of any 
identifiable political theory or any single theory of regulation. In that modest sense, it is a 
genuinely (although only partly) autonomous body of rules, standards, and principles -- 
autonomous in the sense that it has not been systematically captured by any one political or 
ideological approach (except insofar as such an approach prizes legality, procedural safeguards, 
and checks on arbitrariness), and thus cannot be neatly characterized in libertarian or 
nonlibertarian terms. The basic error of the recent D.C. Circuit decisions is to attempt to engraft, 
to a greater or lesser degree, a particular controversial theory -- a libertarian theory of the 
legitimate role of the state, itself rooted in a particular controversial interpretation of public-
choice economics -- onto legal materials that have remained recalcitrant.  
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We do not deny that a hypothetical Supreme Court could move in the direction of 
embracing such a theory. But the existing materials strongly resist the imposition of any 
particular, controversial political vision (whether progressive, as in the 1970s, or libertarian), and 
the reason is simple: American administrative law is fundamentally a compromise. The APA 
itself reflects a compromise between the New Dealers, enthusiastic about the emergence of new 
regulatory institutions, and New Deal critics, seeking to strengthen procedural and judicial 
checks on those institutions.301 Recall the very first sentence of Vermont Yankee: 
 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, which as we have noted 
elsewhere was not only "a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of procedures in 
many agencies," Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), but was also a 
legislative enactment which settled "long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and 
enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest." Id., 
at 40.302 
 
Here Vermont Yankee’s author, then-Justice Rehnquist, pays tribute to the Justice for whom he 
clerked, Robert Jackson, the author of Wong Yang Sung. The vision underpinning both cases is 
that the Administrative Procedure Act should be treated as an organizing charter for the 
administrative state -- a super-statute, if you will303 -- not because it is a grand statement of 
principles with a specific ideological valence, but precisely because it is a compromise 
document. The political, social, and economic forces that swirl around the administrative state – 
not only the APA but also the legalism of the organized bar; technocratic and economic 
approaches to regulatory policymaking; and demands for democratic oversight by elected 
officials and for democratic participation by affected groups and citizens -- have produced a set 
of rules that in effect reconcile and calibrate the cross-cutting considerations. It is inconsistent 
with that basic settlement to select one of the APA’s multiple commitments and elevate it into 
the master principle that should animate administrative law or some of its central doctrines. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, a cadre of lower court judges did just that. Those 
judges built up a body of administrative law principles that had a distinctive political “tilt,” in the 
sense that they operated, apparently by design, to counteract what they saw as anti-regulatory 
pressures within the federal bureaucracy. Recall these remarkable words: “Several recently 
enacted statutes attest to the commitment of the Government to control, at long last, the 
destructive engine of material ‘progress.’ But it remains to be seen whether the promise of this 
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legislation will become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role.”304 In the end, the Supreme Court 
was not enthusiastic about this conception of the judicial role, or about the idea that judges 
should oppose themselves to “the destructive engine of material ‘progress’” (with the last word 
in scare quotes). 
 
We have attempted to show that a number of decisions of the DC Circuit reflect a mirror-
image of the previous approach -- a form of libertarian administrative law. We can find that 
mirror-image in distinctive receptivity to (sometimes plausible) objections from regulated 
entities, and in far less receptivity to (also plausible) objections from public interest groups. We 
can also find it in a series of doctrines that erect special barriers to regulatory activity -- barriers 
that might make sense from the best account of political economy, but that cannot claim firm 
roots in the existing legal materials, and that in some cases affirmatively contradict those 
materials, as we have tried to show.  
 
The contradiction is not accidental or contingent. It will inevitably occur when a judicial 
panel treats administrative law as though it embodies a controversial and politicized account of 
its function  -- the protection of property from interest-group pillage, spurring progressive 
regulation in the face of interest-group resistance, or any similar high-level concern. Because 
administrative law is “a formula upon which opposing political and social forces have come to 
rest,”305 it embraces no such account, and it is a form of infidelity (not “integrity”306) to treat it as 
though there is. Put in Dworkinian terms,307 no master principle will “fit” the legal materials of 
administrative law without serious distortion.  
 
To be sure, the rules of administrative law contain a high degree of open texture and 
flexibility. But only within bounds; and libertarian administrative law, like progressive 
administrative law before it, cannot help but transgress those bounds. Just as the progressive 
judges of the 1970s crossed a line by inventing a form of “hybrid rulemaking” that directly 
contradicted the APA’s two-tier procedural structure of formal and informal rulemaking, so the 
libertarian judges of today have crossed a similar line  -- perhaps most flagrantly by inventing the 
doctrine that agencies are required (in some cases at least) to use notice-and-comment 
rulemaking to change an interpretive rule. The lines of compromise in the APA will not accept 
any such mandate, nor the vision that animates it. 
 
B. Possible Futures 
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 A different question is whether administrative law might become increasingly libertarian. 
The freedom-related and public-choice concerns that account for libertarian administrative law 
are best understood as proposals for a large-scale change of the legal regime, rather than legal 
arguments within the current regime, as we attempted to document earlier. With imaginable 
developments over time, especially on the Supreme Court itself, movements in libertarian 
directions could certainly occur. With respect to the law of standing, for example, the doctrine 
could easily move in more or less libertarian directions, as it has in the past.308 Revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine seems highly unlikely, but in an extreme case, it is not out of the 
question. (The Court has granted certiorari on the Amtrak nondelegation decision,309 so some 
answers are not far off.)  
 
Likewise, the Court could well fortify the protection accorded to commercial advertising. 
The graphic warnings decision is, in our view, a large step beyond existing doctrine, but no one 
would be stunned if five justices were willing to take that step. Strengthened arbitrariness review, 
designed to protect those subject to regulation, seems out of keeping with the Court’s 
instructions,310 and even with prominent decisions on the DC Circuit itself.311 But we cannot rule 
out the possibility that the Court itself would take a hard line against regulations from the SEC, 
perhaps with the assistance of arbitrariness review.312 
 
There is a recent constitutional analogy. For a long period, it seemed as if the Court 
would defer to essentially any decision of Congress under the Commerce Clause.313 Some 
people, interested in the Lost Constitution, deplored the Court’s posture of deference.314 Whether 
or not they believed that the Constitution had been “lost,” a majority of the Court initiated some 
steps in the direction of reasserting what it saw as genuine constitutional limitations.315 Those 
who approved of those steps hoped that large-scale constitutional change was underway.316  
 
Their hopes have not been realized, but in the setting of constitutional debates over the 
Affordable Care Act, the novel arguments advanced to show that Congress lacked power to 
regulate “inaction” were not (in our view) best understood as arguments within the regime of 
constitutional law that has prevailed since the New Deal. Rather they were an effort to strike a 
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blow at the regime itself, with a view to (partially) returning to the Lost Constitution. The 
approach won five votes in NFIB v. Sebelius,317 but not a full victory, because of the presence of 
an alternative holding (upholding the statute as an exercise of the taxing power),318 which will 
allow some future Court to describe the commerce holding319 as unnecessary to the decision, 
should it choose to do so. 
 
 As things now stand, it is unlikely that libertarian administrative law will win even so 
qualified a victory, certainly in the short-run. One reason is political. The environment in which 
libertarian administrative law evolved was one in which the D.C. Circuit was short of its full 
complement of judges for years,320 because Republicans in the Senate blocked new appointments 
to the Court.321 The result was a partisan split of active judges within the Circuit, a split that 
tilted in a heavily Republican direction for some time.322 More recently, however, the Senate 
filibuster rules have been modified to allow judicial appointments by a simple majority,323 and 
President Obama has appointed a clutch of new judges to the Circuit.324 To be sure, libertarian 
administrative law does not perfectly track party lines, especially because many Republican 
appointees have no enthusiasm for it. But there is a powerful correlation, and it seems likely that 
the growth phase of libertarian administrative law is over, at least for the short-term. Perhaps the 
precedents will remain as they are, but perhaps they will be narrowly cabined. With the possible 
exception of protection of commercial advertising, we do not expect significant new 
developments in the directions we have traced. It is imaginable, of course, that a Republican 
president, elected in 2016, could appoint judges with great enthusiasm for libertarian 
administrative law, which would make such developments more likely. But for the immediate 
future, a significant question is whether, and how swiftly, libertarian administrative law will be 
stopped or undone. 
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 In our view, it is not enough for libertarian administrative law not to grow, or even to be 
scaled back. It should also be repudiated in principle, and all its works overthrown. A Vermont 
Yankee II325 is called for to inscribe into the law the principle that no abstract political theory, 
whatever its valence, may be elevated into a master-principle of administrative law. 
Administrative law enjoys a partial autonomy from both quotidian politics and political theories, 
in the modest but important sense that no political view or theory can properly claim to have 
captured the whole terrain or to describe all the rules. As Justice Rehnquist underscored in 
Vermont Yankee itself, the master meta-principle of administrative law it that it just has no 
single theoretical master-principle, at least not with any kind of ideological valence.  And as he 
explained, “The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state 
legislatures are not subject to re-examination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial 
review of agency action.”326 In an appropriate case, the Court should declare authoritatively, for 
a new generation of judges, that the libertarian approach, no less than the progressive approach 
that preceded it, defies the basic commitments of American administrative law.  
 
We have noted that the time is right. The Court’s grants of certiorari in two of the areas 
on which we have focused – involving both the Amtrak nondelegation case and the Mortgage 
Bankers decision about interpretive rules -- would provide the occasion within the compass of a 
single Term to make the basic point unmistakably clear: Administrative law does create a series 
of safeguards against unlawful or arbitrary action, but it is not systematically libertarian, and 
judges have no authority to depart from existing principles, or to make up new doctrines, to push 
it in that direction. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 In the last decades, an extraordinary amount of academic energy has been devoted to the 
idea that the Constitution is in some sense “lost” or “in exile,” and that large-scale doctrinal 
change is necessary in order to assure its restoration. This idea can be found in academic efforts 
to transform contemporary understanding of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Takings Clause (among others). There is no question that 
the academics who endorse this idea believe that the Constitution has a distinctive libertarian 
valence, sometimes captured with the phrase “classical liberalism.”327 
 
 Our goal here has been to show that a number of doctrines on the D.C. Circuit reflect the 
birth of libertarian administrative law, operating as a kind of substitute or the second-best for the 
broader project, with which some of the relevant judges have evident sympathy. We have little 
doubt that a statistical analysis of voting behavior would support this conclusion, with 
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predictable variations across judges. But our approach here has been from an internal point of 
view. We have identified a series of doctrines and decisions -- some high-profile, some relatively 
obscure -- that are, at least in the aggregate, best understood in libertarian terms. Our suggestion 
is not that the court has invariably or systematically imposed a libertarian overlay onto the 
doctrinal materials; case law does not work that way. Nonetheless, the general tendency is clear. 
Some of the resulting doctrines, involving the nondelegation doctrine, commercial advertising, 
and standing, reflect the distinctive kinds of constitutional questions that are an organizing part 
of administrative law. Others purport to be interpretations of the APA itself.  Whatever the legal 
source, the movement toward libertarian principles and outcomes is unmistakable. 
 
 It is no news to say that in the 1970s, the DC Circuit developed a form of progressive 
administrative law, with an identifiable political tilt. Though the tilt was on the surface of some 
of the key opinions, it was generally more subtle, camouflaged in decisions that leaned on a 
tendentious reading of the organic statute, that imposed new procedural requirements, or that 
found agency decisions to be arbitrary when reasonable people could differ. At the time, it was 
not so easy to step back from the details to see the general pattern, though it is evident in 
retrospect. We have attempted to show that something similar is happening today. 
 
 Our principal goal has been descriptive rather than normative. It remains possible to 
celebrate one or more of the doctrinal developments that we have explored, or even to say that an 
accelerated movement in libertarian directions would be desirable. As in the 1970s, however, we 
believe that the underlying developments are at best in serious tension with both the underlying 
sources of law and the governing decisions of the Supreme Court. A dose of legal realism, 
acknowledging the presence and even the inevitability of the occasional “tilt,” has its place, but 
in a hierarchical court system, respect for the governing rules is not optional. 
 
 
